Guardian of coherence among EU defence cooperation tools

EDA’s  coordination  role  in  future  European  capability development will be central. Together  with  its  Member  States  and  EU  institutions,  it  has  helped  assemble  a  set  of  interlocking  tools  and  policies  designed  to  forge  coherence  across  the  full  spectrum  of  capability developments that lie ahead, from defence research to pre-procurement testing and  prototyping  to  acquisition  support.  Without  such  coherence,  Europe’s  defence  sector  will  remain  fractured  into  small  national  markets,  with  all  their  associated  high costs and duplication of effort.

“The momentum created by these initiatives  offers  a  unique  opportunity  to  overcome  this  fragmentation,”  says  EDA  Chief Executive Jorge Domecq. “Achieving that  will  take  time,  of  course,  but  we  now  have the tools at our disposal. The test will be  how  they  are  used  and  whether  they  deliver the expected results.”

EDA  is  well  positioned  to  oversee  how  those  tools  are  used.  For  example,  it  is  the  main  forum  in  Brussels  for  defence  experts  to  exchange  ideas  and  initiatives  on  defence  research  and  technology,  align  procurement  cycles,  pool  demand  for  equipment  and  services,  define  programme  management  goals  and  other  activities critical to generating capabilities. It  has  long  experience  in  managing  defence  research  projects,  for  example,  and  it  functions  as  the  military’s  voice  and  interface  vis-à-vis  EU  institutions  and  policies.

Getting  EDA’s  Member  States  to  move  together  toward  better  and  more  efficient  capabilities  sounds  straightforward  enough, and if it was any sector other than defence that might be true. After all, Europe has  binding  rules  and  standards  for  many  of its sectors such as telecommunications or transport.

But  defence  occupies  in  its  own  unique  category, with only one purchaser – the government – and the obligation to guarantee the security of all other segments of society. These  point  directly  to  matters  of  security  of supply, industrial competences, national military  prerogatives  and  other  aspects  that  account for the traditional divergence and duplication of effort that has characterised Europe’s defence sector as a whole for the past 70 years.

To  create  higher  levels  of  interoperability  between the Member States’ defence capabilities  is  a  major  challenge,  to  put  it  mildly.  But  it  can  be  done  with  enough  time  and  the  right  kind  of  effort  linked  to  what  is  achievable in concrete terms.

The  EU’s  gameplan  for  generating  these  results rests on two pillars: identification of the  interoperable  capabilities  needed,  and  a  set  of  tools  to  support  their  development,  leading ultimately to common planning among Member States.

The desired military capabilities arise from the Union’s  Level  of  Ambition  and  are  defined  by the  EU’s  Capability  Development  Plan  (CDP),  which was revised by Member States in June 2018  in  EDA.  The  agreed  2018  EU  Capability  Development Priorities (11), resulting from the revised  CDP,  address  the  entire  capability  spectrum,  taking  into  account  the  CSDP  capability  shortfalls,  long-term  capability  and technological trends, Member States’ defence plans, and lessons learned from CSDP missions and operations, and provide a  key  reference  for  Member  States’  and  EU’s  capability development.

It falls to the Member States to generate those capabilities, a task easier said than done. Indeed, the EU has framed capability goals for its Member States several times in the past, but to little effect. However, the pressure on Europe for strategic autonomy combined with the new security threats and challenges that now confront its corner of the world demand a far more effective approach to generating European capabilities.

Fortunately, valuable lessons have been absorbed  in  national  and  EU  policymaking  circles about what has, and has not, worked in previous attempts to generate interoperable defence capabilities. There is a new approach to coherence and keeping it on track.

The coherence toolbox 

The  EU  and  its  Member  States  now  have  the  necessary  tools  for  vastly  improved  capability  development  at  European  level.  These  form  a  matrix  of  policies  and  incentives whose sequencing of steps, if  carefully  managed,  will  lead  to  the  capabilities’  realisation.  The  matrix  starts  with the CDP’s priorities.

The  next  step  will  be  to  track  national  progress toward those priorities and to identify opportunities for multi-nation cooperation. Here EDA will have a vital role. In the second half of 2019 it will launch the first  formal  Coordinated  Annual  Review  on  Defence  (CARD)  where  it  will  confer  yearly  with  each  Member  State  to  assess  their  defence  plans  and  spending,  R&D  goals,  budgetary  and  programme  cycles  and  other  aspects  of  capability  development  regarding  the  CDP’s  goals.  As  the  CARD  secretariat, the Agency will extract a global picture  of  the  Member  States’  collective  activity and progress toward the CDP from one year to the next.

EDA carefully prepared the ground for CARD, having  run  a  trial  version  of  the  process  in  2018  and  early  2019.  Among  other  things,  the  trial  run  identified  those  areas  where  the Member States’ interest in collaborative capability development converge the strongest.  These  are  reflected  in  the  new  CDP  and  include  short-range  air  defence,  armoured  vehicles,  helicopters,  medical support, cyber defence, satellite communications,  tactical  unmanned  aerial  systems,  maritime  security  and  maritime  mine countermeasures.

Among  the  trial  CARD’s  most  telling  conclusions is its recommendation that the EU needs to move from ad hoc multinational projects  towards  a  systematic  and  structured  alignment  of  Member  States’  defence  planning.  The  forthcoming  CARD  process  will  support  that  by  aiming  for  gradual  synchronisation  and  mutual  adaption  of  national  defence  planning  cycles, thus leading to more systematic defence cooperation Europe.

Indeed,  the  CARD  is  expected  to  function  as  a  pathfinder  for  identifying  where  defence  ministries  can  collaboratively  develop or procure defence assets. As Domecq  observes,  the  CARD  “will  be  an  essential intermediate step in the overall EU capability development process.”

As opportunities are identified by the CARD, the coherence matrix’s second step hoves into  view:  PESCO,  the  EU’s  legal  framework  for Permanent Structured Cooperation in  defence.  Agreed  by  25  Member  States  in  December  2017,  PESCO  also  uses  the  Agency as its secretariat (along with the European External Action Service, including the EU’s Military Staff).

It  means  EDA  will  function  as  the  platform  where  the  PESCO  participating  Member  States can identify, assess and consolidate the  projects  they  want  to  pursue.  At  the  same time, the Agency will have the leading role  in  annually  evaluating  the  Member  States’ contributions and commitments to PESCO.

Having  already  helped  assess  PESCO’s  two  first  rounds  of  projects,  the  Agency  will  soon  do  the  same  for  the  next  round,  which  will  be  approved  in  November  2019.  EDA’s  input  at  the  early  stage  of  the  projects’ assessment helps ensure there is no unnecessary duplication vis-a-via other initiatives, for example. Yet it is important to  stress  that  PESCO  is  not  just  about  projects. Its more important long-term goal is  to  expand  common  planning,  defence  spending  and  collaboration  among  its  participating  Member  States  –  areas  that  the Agency has pursued since its inception in 2004.

The  third  step  in  the  coherence  matrix  is  the  Commission’s  European  Defence  Fund,  which  will  offer  financial  incentives  for collaborative capability development projects.  The  EDF  will  help  strengthen  the  innovation and competitiveness of the EU’s  defence  industry  by  supporting  joint  defence  research,  capability  prototyping  and acquisition. Whether these are pursued  within  PESCO  or  outside  it,  what  counts  is  that  the  Member  States  pursue  collaborative capability development as much as possible.

The Agency has long experience in liaising with its constituent defence ministries for collaborative efforts, whether for research purposes  or  for  capability  planning  and  implementation, and with industry. It would be  a  natural  partner  for  the  Commission  in  managing  aspects  of  the  EDF  as  the  fund  fully rolls out in 2021. Regardless of how this is  administered,  though,  the  EU  Capability  Development  Priorities  will  remain  as  the  baseline for implementing the CARD, PESCO and the EDF.

Above  all,  EDA  will  continue  its  central  role  as  the  inevitable  hub  for  European  military cooperation, defence technological innovation  and  engagement  with  industry.  Its  unparalleled  technical  expertise  and  unique position as the interface in Brussels between national defence ministries and EU  institutions  have  served  the  Agency’s  stakeholders well for the past 15 years – and will do so for the next 15 as well.