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Tackling piracy in Somalia

"We need to be able to fulfill our responsibilities"

European Council President Herman Van Rompuy
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Welcome

Director Eric Platteau and Editor-In-Chief Philip Butterworth-Hayes introduce this edition of European Defence Matters

European Defence News

EDA and European Commission plan new joint CBRN research work, EDA study highlights priorities for Europe’s land systems industry, EU launches training mission in Mali, News in brief

Cover Story

The two choices now facing European defence

Preserving European defence capabilities at a time of economic crisis

“We need to change ourselves” Special address to the EDA Annual Conference by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council

At the epicentre of European defence...

View from the Top

“Towards a more independent EDA” Interview with Dr. h.c. Susanne Kastner, member of the German Bundestag

Operations and Projects

EUCAP NESTOR: Tackling the roots of piracy in Somalia Interview with Head of the programme, retired Admiral Jacques Launay

New Code of Conduct will help fill capability gaps

Research and Technology

Unmanned maritime systems research breaks new ground

Understanding the cultural issues involved in cooperation

Profile: David Chinn is an Assistant Director of Research and Technology (R&T)

Programmes and Industry

Urgent action under way to provide air tanking capability

Demand consolidation is the first priority

Interview with Gert Runde, Secretary General of the AeroSpace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD)

Independent Viewpoint

Pooling & sharing: What projects offer the best chances of success?

Professor Trevor Taylor is Professorial Research Fellow in Defence Management at the Royal United Services Institute in Whitehall, London

The drivers behind EU crisis management operations

Dr Benjamin Pohl, winner of the first EDA-Egmont PhD Prize in European Defence, Security and Strategy

European defence cooperation: concrete steps for the next year

Pieter De Crem, Belgium’s Minister of Defence

Key Quotes

Key quotes and facts, index to advertisers

Contentst
Your expertise is to simulate the risks generated by a disaster and to foresee the consequences. What is at stake from human and financial perspectives?

Our expertise is to provide simulation capabilities that immerse the various players involved in disaster management in a realistic environment. Such capabilities allow them to perfect their working processes, their independence of action and their decision-making policies during the management of a crisis. We can thus prepare crisis scenarios and represent large-scale disaster conditions while taking individual human factors into account.

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We are an interface between specialists and decision-makers; our simulation is realistic and evolves in an objective manner. It offers solutions to participants as a result of its realism. The player is able to judge the effect of this or that decision and to make a choice with full knowledge of the facts. This allows loss of life to be minimised and also allows for better adjustment of the intervention forces and resources required. The Peruvian civil and military authorities, for instance, use our SWORD simulation to train their crisis management teams for earthquake and tsunami scenarios, improving population support and control in the event of disaster.

Can you explain in a few words the specific nature of your solution, its unique character, its approach?

Our simulation is unique in the world, if you want to represent human factors. Our realistic modelling of human behaviour incorporates the minutest subtleties of human nature. We are continually enriching this aspect and our tool takes into account the global consequences of a disaster – natural or man-made – in terms of the decisions of those responsible for its management.

Our SWORD simulation assists military and civil public authorities to better prepare themselves for all types of disaster, whether a ‘hundred year storm,’ an earthquake, a tsunami, or a terrorist attack, bringing the best possible response for the population at a time of crisis.
At this year’s annual conference of the European Defence Agency (EDA) speakers addressed the challenge facing European Union (EU) Member States seeking to increase their military and security capabilities while balancing their national budgets. There was a general consensus that many of the tough decisions on pooling & sharing capabilities with neighbours – probably the best means for many States to retain vital national capabilities during times of economic hardship – have so far been avoided.

But this situation cannot go on for ever. If current trends continue, defence spending at least in the majority of the Members States will continue to fall. Cooperation is not a substitute for spending but it does help ensure that money is spent as effectively as possible. Figures are contradictory but it is likely that, at best, only three European nations will spend 2% of their gross domestic product (GDP) on defence in 2013 with the majority looking to decrease levels further to 1% or lower.

The politics of this process are entirely understandable but the consequences need to be clearly thought through. If Europe’s citizens are to be protected against a range of developing threats and Europe is to play a significant role on the world stage then the time has come for the continent’s politicians to make hard choices on whether and how future capabilities will be used nationally or internationally.

The European Council in December, where European defence is on the agenda for the first time for a decade, will provide a vital forum for Europe’s defence ministers for these decisions to be made. The Council meeting will give Heads of State and Government the opportunity to develop the detailed ‘joined-up’ policies on collaboration which will link defence and security operations directly with national capability priorities and the vital support needed to preserve strategic industrial assets.

But it will not be easy. These very complex issues facing Europe’s politicians are explored in our cover feature The two choices now facing European defence, which brings together views from all sides of the European defence community on how Europe can collectively act to preserve essential capabilities.

Practical examples of how the EDA is tackling this challenge in its daily work can be found in several features in the issue – including Urgent action under way to provide air tanking capability, Unmanned maritime systems research breaks new ground and New Code of Conduct will help fill capability gaps.

It is not yet too late for the tough decisions to be made.
EDA study highlights priorities for Europe’s land systems industry

The EDA has completed its extensive analysis of the European land defence industry and has highlighted three priority action areas for governments to take if they are to produce a new generation of more capable land vehicles while addressing issues of over-supply and redundancy in the supply chain and strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base (EDTIB).

The EDA has proposed launching a series of European demonstrator programmes to address current key capability shortfalls and to agree common action on key enabling technologies and modern design methods with a special focus on technologies of a transversal nature. At the same time the EDA has developed a Future Land Systems (FLS) study roadmap to provide a comprehensive review of the land systems industrial sector, examining demand and supply side challenges. The FLS roadmap provides recommendations in areas with anticipated high impact on the supply chain, such as maintenance of skills and know-how. It also provides new models for an efficient industrial supply chain to support pooling & sharing and addresses the challenges of intra-European and global competition, such as that from Asia and Latin America.

The study has concluded that the European land industrial sector is more fragmented and less consolidated than the air and naval sectors. It is characterised by overlapping, redundant structures and short production runs, mainly at a national level. In the current financial climate this model is no longer viable and Europe is in danger of losing key capabilities, skills and know-how.

“The land defence industry is not only vital for ensuring key capabilities but also for growth and competitiveness in Europe”, said Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive of the EDA. The annual turnover of the European land defence industry is €17 billion and it directly employs almost 130,000 highly-skilled workers. Land sector industrial activity is mainly supported by the domestic market enabling €6 billion in annual exports outside the European Union.

The FLS study used a methodology-based approach to collate all available information on future military capability requirements. In parallel, a detailed stocktaking of the global land related EDTIP was undertaken. The resultant gap analysis identified critical areas for action, also providing roadmaps with short, mid and long term actions up to 2030, to address the identified shortfalls. Some of the findings address areas of a transversal and cross-sectorial nature and as such, will contribute to the EDA’s broader EDTIB work.

New EDA Deputy Chief Executive

Dutch national Rini Goos (54) took up his role as Deputy Chief Executive of EDA on March 18. Mr Goos previously headed the Commissariat for Military Production in the Netherlands Ministry of Economic Affairs. His responsibilities included the consolidation of the defence and security related industry in the Netherlands. Previous appointments to the Royal Netherlands Embassy in Washington DC and in the Directorate General of Material for the Ministry of Defence featured his involvement in launching the EU-WEU (Western European Union) Group of Experts in opening up European defence markets.

New military airworthiness documents released

The Military Airworthiness Authorities (MAWA) Forum has approved two more airworthiness documents for publication (EMAR 21 Section A & B (combined) and EMAD R). This brings the total number of airworthiness documents now published on the EDA website to seven (see European Defence Matters, issue two).

The MAWA Forum has been set up to harmonize military airworthiness regulations throughout the EU. Jan Plevka, Chairman of the EDA MAWA Forum, said “I am absolutely delighted with the approval of these latest airworthiness documents. A huge amount of effort and commitment is required to harmonize often diverse views and opinions. However, the success that the MAWA Forum has achieved clearly shows the significant cooperation that nations have provided to this activity.” The goal of the EDA MAWA Forum is to have the full suite of EMARs available by the end of 2015.
EDA and European Commission plan new joint CBRN research work

A call for proposals on a new round of research projects into next generation personal and collective protection, advanced decontamination techniques and networking of chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear (CBRN) sensors will be issued as part of the European Framework Cooperation (EFC) agreement between the EDA and the European Commission (EC) later this year.

In a workshop held in Madrid on March 13 2013, as part of the EC Security Research Event, Marco Malacame of the EC and Christian Bréant of the EDA reported that since the exchange of letters of intent between the two organisations in September 2011 a common research programme has been established to identify new areas of research activities, evaluate proposals and implement the research work.

Coordinating activities with the European Commission’s framework research programme led to a first call for proposals under the EDA/EFC agreement in May 2012, focusing on areas such as improved standoff detection capability for chemical agents, simultaneous analysis of mixed samples, next generation point detection for biological agents and modelling and simulation of CBRN system architectures. As a result, seven projects have already been launched and contracts are now in the process of being agreed.

The EDA carries out CBRN research within its Joint Investment Programme (JIP) initiative, a Category A programme with a budget of €12 million. Contributing members are Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Sweden and Norway. The JIP-CBRN provides a broad framework in which to conduct cooperative research in the fields of basic and applied science, to carry technology development up to the level of demonstration projects.

EU launches training mission in Mali

The foreign ministers of the EU formally approved the start of military training operations in Mali on February 18. With an initial mandate of 15 months and a budget of €12.3 million to cover common operating costs, EU Training Mission (EUTM) Mali is intended to help improve the military capacity of the Malian armed forces to enable them to restore the nation’s territorial integrity under the control of civilian authorities.

Headquartered in Bamako and with training to take place at Koulkoro to the north of the capital, EUTM will be commanded by Brigadier General François Lecointre of France. A total of 16 EU states plus Norway will contribute personnel, materiel and expertise to the mission.

Around 250 military trainers and 500 other personnel are expected to participate; their role will be strictly limited to a training and advisory capacity, with no involvement in combat operations.

Focused on military techniques, the mission will also have a role to play in the EU’s wider engagement concerning respect for human rights. The EU will be financing the deployment of civilian human rights monitors from the African Union, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the United Nations. An additional €250 million may be authorised to support ancillary operations, including the restoration of democracy and peace through reconciliation and support of the electoral process.

EU cooperation will also focus on food and water security, sanitation and a re-launch of the Mali economy.

General Lecointre told reporters at a Brussels briefing at the start of March that the scale of the undertaking will be “considerable”. Citing a shortage of basic equipment and a fundamentally poor capacity for mission planning and control, Lecointre described the army as “very much under-equipped and under-endowed in budgetary terms”.

EDA Chief Executive visits Croatia

In advance of the accession of Croatia to the EU in July, EDA Chief Executive Claude-France Arnould visited the country on March 8 and 9. Ms Arnould had meetings with the President of Croatia Ivo Josipovic, Foreign Minister Vesna Pusic, Defence Minister Ante Kotromanovic, the Chief of Defence General Drago Lovric and the Commander of the Croatian Navy Admiral Robert Hranj. The discussions held in Zagreb and Split showed potential for highly beneficial joint activities between Croatia and EDA, including in the areas of maritime surveillance, naval research and technology and support to Croatia’s technological and industrial base.

EDA hosts high-level meetings with EU defence departments

Bernard Cazeneuve, French Minister for European Affairs, visited the EDA on March 11, receiving briefings on the Agency’s air-to-air refuelling initiative and the impact of the Single European Sky ATM research programme (SESAR) for the military community. Claude-France Arnould, EDA Chief Executive, and the Minister exchanged views about the preparation of the European Council of December 2013 which will focus on defence. In this regard, the Minister outlined the need to further develop the EDTIB for ensuring security of supply in Europe.

The meeting follows on from other recent high-level visits to the EDA at the start of the year, from the Italian Minister of Defence Giampaolo di Paola, the Minister of Defence of Slovenia Alèš Hojs, the Minister of Defence of Luxembourg Jean-Marie Halsdorf and the State Secretary at the Serbian Ministry of Defence Zoran Djordjevic. Other recent visits include Milosl Koteréc, State Secretary of the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and Sweden’s State Secretary for Defence Carl von der Esch.
The current economic crisis in Europe brought a new level of frank and open debate at the EDA’s Annual Conference in March in Brussels, as Europe’s defence community met to discuss how European Union (EU) States can collectively fill their capability gaps at a time of decreasing defence budgets, reports Philip Butterworth-Hayes.

Is Europe on the brink of radically enhancing the way it collectively deals with the growing number of regional and global security threats by entering a new, unprecedented era of deeper and wider defence collaboration? Or is the continent drifting towards a new era of lost capabilities, where fragmentation and economic volatility corrode the EU’s ability to respond effectively to crises and strategic industrial assets disappear forever?

While government leaders have repeatedly signalled their commitment to increase collective action this has not yet translated to the fundamental changes needed to meet the current defence and security challenges facing Member States. This was the concern of most of the 450 conference attendees, made up of senior decision makers from the EU defence community, including Member States, industry, European organisations, research bodies and think-tanks. A particular challenge is the prospect that Europe will lose vital industrial capabilities as national programmes are cut and funding for research and technology (R&T) dries up.

“Political will at the highest level is essential,” said Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive of the EDA, introducing the event. “But success will also require the active involvement of those who are responsible for providing our soldiers with the necessary capabilities: capabilities encompassing not only equipment, but also training, employment and logistic support. We need a cutting-edge industry to support our defence, our innovation, our growth and our security of supply. That is why particular attention to European industrial and technological potential is vital in this time of financial austerity.”

“When in November 2011 Defence Ministers approved eleven pooling & sharing priorities they sent a clear signal that, in times of austerity, complex operations and highly advanced technology, acting together is essential if Europe is to preserve and develop the capabilities it requires,” said Ms Arnould.

The growing number of complex defence and security challenges currently facing Member States is daunting enough, even without the financial problems. The lessons of recent crises in Afghanistan, Libya and Mali suggest that not only does Europe need to acquire urgent new capabilities but that military action alone will probably never be enough to successfully resolve many of these issues. Diplomatic, economic and security operations need to be integrated within the overall mix.

“Threats such as terrorism, uncontrolled migration, cyber-attacks and trafficking in people and drugs have blurred the internal and external dimensions of security,” said Alan Shatter, Ireland’s Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence, representing the Presidency of the EU. “The European Security Strategy clearly articulates the fact that today’s threats and challenges are not purely military and are not resolvable by purely...
The EDA's annual conference – a landmark event

The annual conference of the EDA is now a landmark occasion for the European Union defence community. The 2013 event, held on March 21 in Brussels, brought together 450 key decision-makers from the EU area and beyond, including Member States, European institutions, research bodies, think-tanks, industry and the media.

Keynote speakers included Herman Van Rompuy President of the European Council, Cathy Ashton Head of the EDA, Alan Shatter TD Irish Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence representing the EU Presidency and Claude-France Arnould Chief Executive of the EDA.

Three sessions – ‘Lessons from defence cooperation’, ‘Looking ahead: setting the longer-term goals for European defence cooperation’ and ‘European defence cooperation: concrete steps for the next year’ framed the debates on what needed to be done by European governments to meet their capability targets and preserve strategic defence technology know-how in the continent.

This year’s event was notable for the intensity of debate from different panel members and contributors from the floor as to the stark challenges now facing Europe’s politicians.

military means. Each requires a mix of modalities, expertise, instruments and responses. Yet even in the core military area Europe is still missing some vital capabilities, according to Minister Shatter.

“This was evident in the Libyan crisis in 2011, when European capability gaps had to be filled by the United States. However, even on smaller missions such as the EU Training missions in Mali and Somalia, the EU still has a major difficulty in ensuring the availability of key enablers. These include strategic lift, air-to-air refuelling, information/surveillance/reconnaissance (ISR), satellites, transport and attack helicopters and medevac facilities.”

General Patrick de Rousiers, Chairman of the EU’s Military Committee, was particularly concerned that the two growing threats of terrorism and cyber security needed a more coordinated approach by Member States as there were considerable differences in their level of preparedness.

The economic crisis has encouraged States to think in new ways about how to acquire, retain and enhance national capabilities.

“It would be unrealistic of me to expect overall European defence budgets to suddenly increase,” said Cathy Ashton, Head of the EDA, High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy and Vice-President of the European Commission. “We have to do better with our existing resources and capabilities. And we have to invest smartly. I would argue that the only way to do this is through cooperation, including →
through pooling & sharing. Cooperation provides an opportunity for European nations to acquire together what is out of reach individually. The choice is simple: either cooperate to acquire capabilities or risk losing those capabilities altogether. But defence cannot and must not be viewed in isolation, not least because the distinction between military and civil technology has become increasingly blurred. So many technological innovations have both civil and military applications, in sectors such as space, cyber, maritime surveillance, and unmanned aerial systems, to name just a few. Indeed, 70% of defence research and technology efforts have a civil application.

The role of the EDA as a key enabler to help Member States meet their capability shortfalls is assuming an increasing importance, said many of the event speakers. This is not just because of the expertise it has gained over the previous decade in working with national Member States defence departments to pool & share capabilities but also because it can support, as an intergovernmental Agency within the EU, the interests of defence actors. It has also established pragmatic and effective cooperation with NATO. "Cooperation between NATO Allied Command Transformation (ACT) and the EDA is essential," said General Palomeros, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Transformation. "There is a pressing need to balance defence commitments from both sides of the Atlantic, and European partners will need to deliver their full share in capabilities." Developing harmonised European requirements is essential for interoperability as well as for industry. Some occasions have been missed, others have been successful. We should learn for the future.

Despite the problems the EDA has made significant progress over the last year in addressing capability gaps through pooling & sharing, said Peter Round, the EDA’s Capabilities Director. Ten Member States are now working on a joint procurement programme to acquire urgently needed air-to-air refuelling assets in the short, medium and long-term. A further procurement initiative is underway to access satellite communications services from the civil sector for a range of operational needs. Another multi-national initiative has been launched to provide medical hospitals for troops in the field. The Agency is also working on improving efficiency in capability management, according to Peter Round, via its initiatives on diplomatic clearances of transport aircraft, for example, and innovative tools like the Third Party Logistic Support agreement. With Member States all agreeing a new Code of Conduct on pooling & sharing (see also New Code of Conduct will help fill capability gaps, this issue) the door to deeper and wider collaboration is opening wider.

A critical potential catalyst to increasing cooperation and synergies is the meeting of the European Council in December this year in which defence issues will play a major part. Conference participants agreed that this meeting will have to provide strategic impulse for European defence and for empowering European institutions to speed initiatives such as pooling & sharing and encouraged the European Council to consider significant domains in defence collaboration, such as space, cyber defence, and RPAS.

"The European Council on Defence meeting in December will provide the Union, for the first time in four years, with the opportunity to address defence related issues at the highest political level," said Alan Shatter. "While the fiscal and sovereign debt crisis has necessarily been the primary focus for Heads of State and Government in the past few years, we now have the opportunity, prior to the European Council meeting, to discuss and agree on the key defence issues that should be prioritised at this meeting."

Pieter de Crem, Belgium’s Minister of Defence, mentioned in a written statement the need to now adopt both a “top-down” and “bottom-up” approach to align national defence planning with multi-national European defence needs. In the future Member States should look increasingly as specialising their military capabilities within the European context – and pooled sovereignty means shared responsibility. It is far better to have collective capabilities rather than unsustainable or non-existent national ones," he insisted.

Among some of the options open to the European Council for urgent consideration to ensure the European defence technological and industrial based is preserved would be increasing the EDA’s budget to generate funding for larger pooled & shared procurement programmes was suggested by Tom Enders and Bogdan Klich, Senator of the Republic of Poland.

A further critical input into the Council’s
meeting later this year will come from the European Commission, whose task force investigating ways to preserve the EU's defence industrial sector during these tough economic times is due to report later in the year. Daniel Calleja, Director General of the Enterprise and Industry Directorate General of the European Commission, outlined some of the priorities already identified by the task force for urgent consideration by European governments - including enhancing the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), strengthening the internal defence market, promoting growth among small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) through more open access to financing, and improving R&T levels of funding. While the Commission's remit is restricted to non-defence related activities it has a considerable role to play in areas of security and funding research via the framework and Horizon 2020 programmes which have the potential for dual-use (civil and military) technology outcomes.

So which option will Europe choose - collectively enhancing national capabilities through increased cooperation or capability decay and fragmentation? The answer, if most of the views of delegates and speakers at the EDA's Annual Conference are to be taken into account, will now depend on how quickly Member States act over the coming months to implement policies agreed at the high level on defence cooperation. The European Council in December could be decisive in determining which of these two paths is chosen.
Preserving European defence capabilities at a time of economic crisis

We need more involvement of industry to trigger cooperation," said EDA chief executive Claude-France Arnould. "Industry needs the oxygen of a well-functioning market. But it also needs programmes, today and in the future. Industry also has a central role to play in providing solutions through cooperation." At the same time she felt it was important to be realistic; it was unlikely that the EDA would suddenly see a 20% increase in its budget unless the full potential of the Treaty is exploited, in particular regarding EDA's possible role in procurement – but if more Member States came forward to support individual pooling & sharing programmes that would be an excellent start. "Money or the general budget of EDA is not just the only sign of support," said Ms Arnould. "If it is clear pooling & sharing has the full support of the administrations involved as well as the ministers that would be very helpful."

"Our assessment is that, by and large, Europe will have to face a decade with no growth and more likely a further decline in defence budgets; I think it is very important that all of us draw the right conclusions from that," said Tom Enders, Chief Executive of the European Aeronautics Defence and Space Company (EADS).

"Unless serious action is taken Europe risks losing key elements of its defence industrial base as skilled personnel either leave or transfer to civil industry," said Mr Enders. European governments needed to consolidate their demand for defence equipment, which would provide the larger sums of money needed to sustain Europe's defence technology base. But so far there was no sign of the political will required for this. "I need to express my scepticism about getting things moving," he said. "We've been talking about this for more than 20 years, and very little is moving. The sums currently passing through the EDA remained "a drop in the ocean" compared to total EU defence spending, he said. "We need to provide the EDA with some serious money and some serious instruments to drive forward decisions."

Tom Enders was one of the contributors to the panel sessions of the conference – which provoked a new kind of frank and uncompromising analysis of the current challenges facing the EU's defence sector.

"The biggest threat to European defence today is shrinking budgets," said Arnaud Danjean, Chairman of the Subcommittee on Security and Defence of the European Parliament, who drew a large round of applause from delegates when he questioned how much of a priority European defence really was for some European Member States. The expectation for the European Council is to reverse this trend.

"I have doubts about the current budget of the EDA," said Bogdan Klich, Senator of the Republic of Poland, suggesting that as the EDA was the only European organisation actively working to increase defence cooperation it would need more resources to undertake its role. "Pooling & sharing is one of the greatest European defence achievements of the last two to three years," he said.

"It's really an opportunity, the situation we are facing now," said Detlef Selhausen, National Armaments Director, Germany. "Cooperation should take place in areas where you can save money, such as in support and maintenance."
While there were plenty of successful cooperative efforts underway in Europe, too often they were being developed “in silos” suggested many speakers. General Tom Middendorp, Chief of Defence in the Netherlands, thought that cooperation should not be limited to the development and exploitation of capabilities but should also take account of their operational use. “Having capabilities but no common political ground to actually use them would lead to a rather ineffective defence cooperation and could even create a false sense of security,” he believed.

But there were plenty of positive experiences of collaboration to build on. General Claudio Debertolis, Italy’s National Armaments Director, spoke of how pooling & sharing and the development of multi-national defence equipment programmes was now built into Italy’s strategic defence thinking.

General Patrick de Rousiers, Chairman of the Military Committee of the EU, gave the example of the European air transport command which had been created in a relatively short time.

The first flight last year of the NEURON RPAS was another example of successful European cooperation, said Eric Trappier, Chairman of the ASD Defence Commission and Chief Executive Officer of Dassault Aviation, involving six nations and a budget of €400 million.

But not all European states faced the same problems. Krzysztof Krystowski, Chief Executive Officer of Poland’s BUMAR group suggested some states in Central and Eastern Europe had different defence priorities to those in the West. For many of these states, their economies were expanding and defence budgets were stable. Threats were different, too, and less built around the concerns of political instability in the Middle East or Africa. Their industries wanted to work increasingly with Western European suppliers both domestically and throughout the continent but were finding it difficult to break into these markets.

The priorities for European defence leaders were also discussed. Antonio Missiroli, Director of the European Institute for Security Studies, suggested that the priorities could be securing the European homeland, securing the European neighbouring areas, securing global commerce and ensuring access to energy.

Daniel Calleja, Director General of the Enterprise and Industry Directorate General of the European Commission, pointed out that this final aspect was particularly important. “Europe’s military spends around €1 billion a year on energy,” he said, “the same as a small European state”.

Detlef Selhausen
"We need to change ourselves"

Special address to the EDA Annual Conference by Herman Van Rompuy, President of the European Council
European defence matters. And to the members of the European Council, the 27 Presidents and Prime Ministers that I represent, it matters tremendously.

It matters for the security of our citizens and our home countries, and to uphold our interests and values in the world. It matters because of the jobs, the cutting edge technologies, the potential for growth that collectively you represent. And for those very reasons, as you know, I have arranged for leaders to discuss how to improve European defence at our summit in December.

The European Defence Agency is a young institution, but in the eight years since its creation, you have made your mark. Knowing well the challenges of setting up something from scratch, I can say this is no small achievement! Being in a way a ‘facilitator’ myself, I have a lot of sympathy for the Agency’s role: facilitating can be hugely rewarding but testing at times! We have to be pragmatic and result-driven, and also unremitting and very, very patient. In defence matters this is particularly true. You measure time – not in the hours and days of the markets, especially at moments like these but in years and even decades.

But the defence industry is specific in another aspect too. Saying it’s not like buying and selling shoes is an understatement. The relationship between governments, as sole customers but also as regulators, and the defence industry, is unlike any other. And for that very reason, it is good to see all the stakeholders together here today. Your work, your close cooperation, is key to ensure that all European men and women in the field are well-trained and well-equipped. And having visited troops and teams from Afghanistan to Georgia – both as Prime Minister of my country and in my current capacity – I know how important that is.

Recent years have confirmed that we are facing a fast evolving strategic landscape. Of course traditional threats did not crumble with the Iron Curtain. But along them, we are also facing new threats, threats that are partly de-territorialised and dematerialised. To deal with them effectively, we must engage even closer with our partners. Yet, as rightly underlined in our common Security Strategy, “even in an era of globalisation, geography is still important”. And this puts the Union at the forefront when it comes to security in our neighbourhood.

These are unstable times, times of change. The European response has been proactive; the engagement of our countries – and that of the Union – in the Arab and Sahel regions testify to that. But these evolutions also highlighted once again that we need to change ourselves. Every-one of us is drawing the lessons of Libya, and more recently Mali. Starting with the gaps in capabilities that were laid bare – from air-to-air refuelling to field hospitals and force protection.

This hardly matches the high expectations of the countries of the region, who look to us for support for their own security and stability, trusting in our unique and comprehensive approach to conflict prevention.

In the new strategic environment, we need to be able to fulfil our responsibilities. And we are encouraged to do so by our most trusted ally, the United States, who is also in the process of repositioning itself. We are responsible for our security and we must contribute to that of our neighbourhood. But do we have the means?

This question of the means is all the more acute that we are facing tight financial constraints. I know it all too well dealing with budget issues has proven to be the daily bread for a President of the European Council.

Cuts in defence spending are not a new phenomenon – and of course partly related to a post Cold-War perception of diminished threats. But with the crisis, they are accelerating. All in all, if current trends persist, by 2017 we risk having lost 12% of our overall defence spending since the start of the crisis: the equivalent to the entire current defence budgets of Poland, Spain and the Netherlands. Let us be honest: even if this decline may not be as important as forecasted, it will be substantial.

Due to many constraints, not least time pressure, most of these cuts are taking place with very little coordination between capitals. The risk – and it is very real – is that our skills and hardware erode and that the disconnect between our needs and means keeps widening. This could jeopardise our future. The question is not only how much we spend, but also how we spend. It’s about being clear on what we want to achieve, and the means we need to do so.

Each country is different, and the overall picture is notoriously complex. But the fact is that while together we have more troops than the United States, our capacity to deploy them is more limited. The fact is also that vast amounts of money still go to maintaining costly, obsolete equipment at the expense of essential investments.

And I can’t help but wonder how, still today, demand is so fragmented that we have over a dozen helicopter models in Europe, when it would make so much sense to take advantage of economies of scale, while guaranteeing supply.

I am well aware of all the constraints, but the fact is that as long as we duplicate as much as we do today, it will be very difficult to maintain the best standards for our armies. Military experts are telling us we will not be able to maintain key military assets under current trends. In the end, to guarantee our ability to defend ourselves effectively, something needs to change.

Of course there are no easy or quick solutions. Stating the obvious, we are a Union of 27 states (26 here at the EDA, and 2 belonging to NATO). We have different perceptions of threats and needs; different attitudes as regards our missions and roles in the world; and different needs and interests as customers and producers of defence equipment. We know that security is broader than defence, but defence is an essential part of our security. And the fact is that the threats concern us all...
Take for instance terrorism, and cyber-terrorism: a potential threat to the arteries of globalised modern life: telecommunication, banking systems, airports or energy grids... Or take our maritime security. No less than 90% of EU external trade is carried by sea, so this is a priority that none of our countries can ignore. And one on which Europeans, together, can make a difference, as the success of operation Atalanta in fighting against piracy shows. And the fact is that much cooperation is already taking place. European troops systematically deploy together in missions, whether in NATO, EU or UN missions. However when our troops return to their respective home bases, it’s a very different story. Only few countries seize opportunities to cooperate at home – despite the obvious advantages in terms of savings and sharing of best practices.

What we call “pooling & sharing” is not a new issue (it was in the EU Security Strategy ten years ago), and very good things have been done. The Dutch and Belgian navies train their staff together and commission equipment jointly, while keeping separate crews and separate fleets. For instance, the education for marine cooks is done in Belgium rather than Holland, it will not come as surprise! The Baltic countries have set up a joint defence college instead of three separate ones. And their Scandinavian neighbours also specialise when it comes to education: the Finns teach military observers and the Danes military police officers. The Visegrad countries have agreed to set up a common battlegroup by 2016, and – better known to the wider public – France and the UK are engaged in an ambitious cooperation, reinvigorated in recent years by the Lancaster House summit.

Within the EDA, many of you have also developed promising projects, sometimes with lead countries, for instance on helicopter training and satellite procurement (both in place), and on field hospitals and air-to-air refuelling (where work is ongoing). There are other areas, such as surveillance drones, where we risk losing out both as consumers and as producers. I know ‘drones’, militarily speaking, are supposed to be lean and ungraspable so anything but ‘flagships’, but in terms of projects they could be precisely that! A flagship.

Beyond the fields of military training and maintenance, there are other areas where we are hardly at the beginning of defence cooperation: in particular, technological innovation (for our industrial base), and procurement (for investment and equipment). Here also, as an expert put it, “reluctance becomes unaffordable”. I understand in practice it is more complicated. There is the fear of losing your capacity to act autonomously – when deciding where and when your troops deploy, or not... or when having to adapt technical standards in order to buy jointly. Discussions can go all the way up from the size of bullets to the sovereignty of our countries... And even on the budgetary front it is not always clear-cut. There is the fear of extra initial costs, not least potential job losses. Also it clearly does not help that defence ministries have no assurance that money saved through pooling & sharing will be reinvested into defence - a dilemma that I’m afraid will sound familiar to many in the audience today.

Cutting in haste (under pressure from national Treasuries eager for ‘more cuts now’) doesn’t leave time to look into how to rationalise spending through cooperation. No-one here is naïve. We all know that – beyond the money aspects, beyond pragmatic arrangements – decisions on defence go to the heart of any state’s independence. These decisions are not easily shared, sometimes not even with trusted partners.

But this makes it all the more urgent to identify those areas where gaps or delays are, quite visibly, irresponsible – and to convince the public at large that European nations must act jointly.

How do we move forward? The crisis should not be seen as an excuse to put things off but instead as an opportunity to launch initiatives, to preserve capabilities that would otherwise be lost to budget cuts.

Here’s the way I see it: defence cooperation is not about the management of decline, no, quite the opposite, it’s the way to ensure we remain cutting-edge and fully play our role in the future!

Overall we share the premises of a common analysis of the threats, as crystallised in our European Security Strategy and as shown so often on the ground. In fact our strategy can be read in action through the many missions and operations in which member states are involved together – from Afghanistan to Kosovo and from the Congo to Somalia.

A more explicitly shared view of the strategic context would be essential to steer day-to-day choices and help shape decisions with a long-term impact on budgets, on investments, on personnel. It should in any case not be an academic exercise but be geared toward operational conclusions and results.
Now is the time to be very concrete: to set the right incentives, involve more countries in existing projects, and get more joint projects off the ground.

The Agency has a key role to play. Clearly it can’t do everything, but it can fully play its role as facilitator. By ‘changing mindsets’, spreading best practices, helping identify solutions and set them into motion. Of course, change does not happen overnight, but as those of you who know me better are already aware: I strongly believe in progress as a series of steady steps in the right direction.

Here let me say a few words on how I now see the process launched last December, in view of the European Council discussion at the end of the year. As you have noticed, my main concern is not so much CSDP as such or ‘EU defence’, but rather the state of defence in Europe. That’s how Presidents and Prime Ministers look at these issues together. To them, defence means national defence as much as deploying abroad. The transatlantic relationship remains vitally important; that is not under discussion. At stake is under what conditions, in the current budgetary context, Europe can remain a credible partner; under what conditions we can fulfil our separate and joint security responsibilities.

To take matters forward, all depends on the member states, who are in the driving seat. EU structures and means (like the EDA, but also the EEAS and the Commission) are essentially there to support – as service providers and facilitators – and to help build trust. That’s also where I see the role of Heads of State and Government: perhaps the intricacies of armament procurement are not their daily business, but they do care about security, about soldiers, about jobs, about budgets. And there is more: in that very financial crisis leaders uniquely experienced how interdependent our countries have become; they know, and it was and is not always an agreeable discovery, that they are co-responsible. The same goes for their joint responsibility for our continent’s defence; there also, decisions in one country, will affect others.

There is too little public awareness of this, and in that respect precisely, Presidents and Prime Ministers are uniquely placed to convince a wider public opinion, and thereby to set things into motion. But to make the best of that potential, which I hope to channel between now and December, we must prepare carefully and I need your help. For the defence dimension of our discussion in December (as distinct from the CSDP dimension), for me the important thing is to make concrete progress on three key issues:

1. priorities for future investment and equipment procurement;
2. strengthening our industrial base, so that it remains competitive and innovative;
3. and finally, the preparation and availability of forces.

I know intense work is already happening, between capitals and within the EDA – also on implementing the code of conduct on pooling & sharing you adopted last November. There are indeed many concrete, practical questions with which we need to come to terms; for instance:

- How can we really set common priorities for investments, and effectively coordinate our budgets?
- How can we further consolidate demand?
- While civilian money needs to be used for civilian purposes, can we reap the benefits of research for dual use?
- How do we set the right incentives to ensure savings are reinvested into defence?
- And as we pool & share, how do we guarantee access to capabilities when needed?
- Finally, let us not forget that empowering partners is also one of our core capabilities!
- How can we make this more systematic?

These are just examples, not meant to be an exhaustive list... As you will have gathered by now, my aim is not to produce yet another strategic paper ahead of the December summit. What we need are tangible projects; all initiatives, whether bilateral or trilateral or in group, are welcome!

Cooperation will be different according to projects and groups of countries. There is no one-size-fits-all. We must be pragmatic. This is the way European defence, like the Union itself, is being built: pragmatically. And it is from the link between industry and defence that emerge ideas for innovation, and for a common defence, built together. A winning situation for all!

So let’s start by identifying the concrete obstacles and find ways to overcome them or work around them, it is a work for policy-makers but I trust, looking at all of you here today, that all leading industry actors will be involved and themselves come up with constructive ideas.

Europe was born out of the ashes of a war. And built, at first, by pooling (& sharing!) the instruments of war: coal and steel.

Upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo last December, European leaders said the European Union stands by those in pursuit of peace and human dignity. To fulfill such responsibilities, we should make sure we have the means at our disposal.

"I have a lot of sympathy for the Agency’s role: facilitating can be hugely rewarding but testing at times!"
Delegates arrive at the Albert Hall Complex, Brussels, the venue for this year’s EDA Annual Conference.
At the epicentre of European defence...

The opening address was given by Mrs Claude France Arnould, the EDA’s Chief Executive (above). Ireland’s Defence Minister Alan Shatter represented the presidency of the European Union (top left).
The panel sessions featured lively and frank debates, reflecting the current challenges facing the European defence sector.
European Council President Herman Van Rompuy (top right) opened the afternoon session, which highlighted the next steps Europe needed to take to strengthen defence capabilities throughout the continent.
The reforms relating to the strategic reorientation of the German Bundeswehr are well underway. What are the main pillars of this reform and what are the main challenges for 2013?

The German Bundeswehr is undergoing a major reform, with some of the main areas being the abolition of conscription, a reduction of military personnel, definition of new tasks and responsibilities and a reorganisation of all service branches. The reform aims at preparing the Bundeswehr to face both current tasks and expected future developments.

It is a major endeavour and some of the main challenges for 2013 are to assure its financing – budgets are falling short everywhere. We also have to ensure that the Bundeswehr remains an attractive employer.

Demographic change and competition from industry means that we have to work hard to recruit the best new talents. This also includes allowing for a fair work/family balance.

France has – with the support of different Member States – deployed troops to Mali and Europe has agreed on a training mission there. Nevertheless, there has been criticism of the ‘weak’ European response to this crisis coupled with lack of strategic assets becoming available. What is your view on this?

In my view offering a training mission for Malian forces was a very good decision. As you know, any deployment of German military personnel or assets has to be mandated by the German Bundestag.

Nevertheless we were able to act quickly, to demonstrate our support to the training mission as well as to the French intervention. For example Germany supported the French initiative with its C-160 transport aircraft. We should also not forget that the donor conference raised substantial funds for both military and non-military expenditures. I therefore do not agree with the notion of a ‘weak’ European response.

Regarding the lack of strategic assets, we have already seen in the past where Europe is missing capabilities. Air-to-air refuelling certainly is one of them. The harmonisation of standards for tanker and receiver aircraft could be one way to mitigate this.
mutual benefit. Do you think these offers are already sufficiently explored?

For the time being they certainly aren’t but I hope that they will be in future. Many of the offered pooling & sharing projects are very useful and could lead to important savings. The current financial climate and the resulting budget cuts unfortunately do not allow Member States to participate in all of these projects. Additionally, the national focus understandably still lies in safeguarding national capabilities. Pooling & sharing however asks for cooperation - which sometimes might also mean not directly owning a capability.

Encouraging Europe's industrial base in the defence sector is very important in terms of growth and innovation. What initiatives would you like the Agency to take in this area, given its mandate to support the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base?

As I have said, I think Europe lacks common standards or could do with more harmonisation. This would allow industry and nations alike to save costs; it would allow common procurement and more pooling & sharing. For example you currently see a lot of military vehicles sold throughout Europe but each country wants to customise its own vehicles. In my view this is counterproductive.

Heads of State will discuss defence topics during a summit in December 2013. What should be on their agenda?

President Van Rompuy has set out the most important questions on the agenda of the summit: how to increase the effectiveness, visibility and impact of the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP); how to enhance the development of defence capabilities; and how to strengthen Europe's defence industry. These are certainly the most important questions for Europe and defence today.

If you think of the role of the EDA over the next ten years how do you see the Agency evolving?

I hope that the Agency will in future be financed by the European Union rather than by Member States as that would mean common issues would be more to the forefront. The Agency could still be used as a vehicle by some Nations. The Agency should be more independent from Member States; Member States are subject to fluctuations, political or economic, and the economic aspect in particular can be a danger for the Agency. We should try to avoid that risk.
EUCAP NESTOR: Tackling the roots of piracy in Somalia

Launched in July 2012 EUCAP (EU Capability) NESTOR is a capability building mission aimed at improving and building on maritime security capabilities in the Horn of Africa. Head of the programme is retired Admiral Jacques Launay, former Deputy Chief of the French Naval Staff and General Inspector for Armed Forces, who gave this interview to Tim Mahon from his headquarters in Djibouti in mid-January.

Could you please describe the scope, target and timelines for EUCAP NESTOR?

The mission was launched by a decision of the Council of Ministers on 18th July last year and we deployed an enabling team here in Djibouti in early September. This team is dedicated to the implementation of the mission on the ground and will be supported by other components of the mission in other locations. I made two trips to the area in the interim period, one to Djibouti, the Seychelles and Nairobi and the second to Kenya with the High Representative at the end of August: we are still negotiating the permanent stationing of a team in Kenya, but we are able to work in Djibouti, in Seychelles and from Kenya for Somalia.

This is a regional security building mission aimed primarily at enhancing maritime security in the Horn of Africa, being based and working with Djibouti, Kenya, the Seychelles and Somalia. These countries are the initial participants and we hope for others to join. Tanzania has expressed an interest but not yet joined.

EUCAP NESTOR will not operate in isolation, for there will be collaboration with other EU missions such as Operation Atalanta – and the key issue is maritime security at the regional level. There is also collaboration with the EUTM (EU Training Mission) in Somalia. Although the training is currently taking place in Kampala, Uganda, it will transition to Mogadishu in the coming months and the team is doing a very good job at this early stage.

One of the fundamental mission aims is to tackle the roots of piracy in Somalia, and we will do this in providing training, mentoring, advisory and educational services to help stabilize Somalia’s maritime policing activities. In addition we are promoting bilateral and regional cooperation to extend the scope to the regional level. For example, we are working with the International Maritime Organization (IMO) through synergies with the Djibouti Maritime Training Centre.

We deployed the initial enabling team (22 people plus one in Brussels) in September and are establishing our logistics while we await
reinforcements in the form of human resources. To be frank, we are implementing all procedures as we proceed, but the signs are that good progress is being made and we will open the mission headquarters very soon, with an opening ceremony scheduled for mid-February.

We have to differentiate the initial operating capability on a country by country basis, since there are different dynamics in each nation, but progress is continual. Once we have achieved this we can move on to develop the regional aspects of the mission and the mentoring, advising, training activities for our Somali partners. Timelines will be constructed in partnership with host countries.

**Could you please outline the roles of the main participants? In particular, what assets are participating member states contributing?**

First we have to appreciate that this is a capacity building mission. We are not providing hardware such as ships or fast patrol boats; we are providing assets in the form of human resources – experience, expertise and support. We are therefore promoting the human resources made available to us by participating Member States (pMS) and placing these competencies at the disposal of the relevant local and regional authorities.

There are 15 nations already contributing to this pool of competence. For example, my deputy is a Dutchman, the senior political advisor is British, the press and public affairs officer is Belgian and the country team leader in Seychelles Swedish. Our senior maritime advisor comes from Spain, our legal advisor is British, the senior police advisor from Germany and in mid-January we had a police officer from Norway joining the team.

The result is we have a powerful team developing to be able to advise, mentor and teach – sharing competencies and experience that are complementary to what local security organizations have already begun to do.

**What lessons are being learned about joint security operations within an EU structure which may be carried forward into future operations?**

It is a little early to tell as yet and it is worth pointing out we are a civilian mission with some military expertise. Our role is part of the EU global approach and is a somewhat difficult mandate because we have to coordinate our activities with many different actors.

The main conclusion at this early stage is that coordination is the key. Because there are so many different actors and because we are an EU family, we need to ensure that the same state of play is available to all on which to proceed – this is the only way to provide for all the approaches to remain coherent and effective. And in order for that to work, we need to make certain that what we are doing on the ground here is also reflected by activity and support in Brussels.

"One of the fundamental mission aims is to tackle the roots of piracy in Somalia, and we will do this in providing training, mentoring, advisory and educational services to help stabilize Somalia's maritime policing activities”

**How is success of the mission being measured?**

A difficult question to answer so early in the process. What benchmarks will we use for such measurement? Political, technical, operational? Thinking about the current state of play with regard to Somali maritime policing, for example, when can we expect to see resonance with the support we are providing?

I think one benchmark will be the degree to which each country assumes ownership of action. We can help develop the capability; each nation must then implement that, exercising sovereignty over their own waters and in close collaboration with their neighbours. This is a very dynamic environment, but I think it is this question of ownership that will be one of the key criteria by which we will be able to measure success.

This will, however, be a permanent political debate and I must repeat we are not the only actors on this stage. We are working closely with the United Nations, for example, whose interests, among others, are focused on the issue of the rule of law. Because of some of these complexities, I think it likely that the benchmarks to gauge success will be established later.

**What will be the legacy of the mission once it is complete?**

It is not that easy to talk about a legacy of the mission as such as we are just at the startup phase of EUCAP NESTOR – I see it more as a part of an overall EU legacy. This is a EUCAP (EU Capability) mission and as such is a component of overall policy. The Council Decision gave us a mandate of two years initially, but I see this as being a long term mission.

We are here to promote – and implement – a policy related to the goal of stabilisation and security on a regional basis. If we reach that, we will be successful and stabilisation will be the legacy we can continue to nurture and develop.
European Union (EU) defence ministers have agreed that cooperation should be systematically considered from the outset to support EU defence departments to develop defence capabilities. A key enabler to this is a new Code of Conduct on pooling & sharing. The objective now is for the Code to be implemented by individual defence departments in the most effective manner.

At the informal Ministerial meeting under the Belgian presidency in 2010, Sweden and Germany proposed that the Agency should examine pooling & sharing intensively, with a view to identifying specific areas in which early progress could be achieved. Many initiatives had already begun but others had yet to get off the ground, so during 2011 the Agency looked at the overall state of play and identified key areas where progress could be made quickly. At the EDA Steering Board meeting in November 2011 EU defence ministers endorsed a list of 11 pooling & sharing opportunities.

"It's very much work in progress. We have made significant achievements but nobody should assume we are anywhere near mission accomplished. I think this is going to be a long haul – an iterative process," said Graham Muir, Head of the Policy and Planning Unit at the EDA.

It quickly became apparent that if the initiative were to be successful it could not be done only on an ad hoc basis. In April 2012 four nations – Belgium, Finland, Greece and Luxembourg – suggested a more structured approach to define a concrete framework in which pooling & sharing could be advanced. The Agency decided, in parallel with the specific project work in which it was already engaged, to try to create such a structured approach. "We were pretty clear about the content – the challenge was to secure Member States' buy-in," said Muir.

At the informal Ministerial meeting in Cyprus in September 2012 the EDA tabled a paper outlining its suggestions for the Code, which Ministers approved two months later. "EDA will continue to drive pooling & sharing forward as a pragmatic, flexible and cost-effective model, and avoiding bureaucratization. The Code of Conduct will facilitate cooperation, and make pooling & sharing sustainable now and in the future," said Claude France-Arnould, EDA’s Chief Executive after the Cyprus meeting.

"We have continued to add projects to the list but we now have a better framework within which to work. We don't for a moment claim all these ideas as our own – a lot of them were inspired by the four-nation paper issued in April last year," said Muir.

There are several benefits to adopting a more structured approach, rather than continuing with the former ad hoc process, according to Muir. "The EDA is not the only actor working on cooperation; there is considerable effort expended in other institutional frameworks, such as NATO, as well as bilateral and regional clusters. There is a plethora of such initiatives but what's clear is that Member States want coherence between the various initiatives, thereby achieving the twin objectives of

New Code of Conduct will help fill capability gaps

A new Code of Conduct will help to mainstream pooling & sharing in Member States' planning and decision-making processes, writes Tim Mahon
avoiding unnecessary duplication and ensuring gaps are filled where possible."

Another objective was to try to embed the pooling & sharing in Member States’ defence planning and national decision-making processes. In Sweden, for example, cooperation is the default option. "If you don't want to collaborate on a particular capability, you have to demonstrate why going it alone is a better option," said Muir.

The Code will now be implemented nationally, on a voluntary basis. "The signals we have had have been positive. There will also be an assessment process, which is why at the end of the Code we have a section outlining how implementation will be assessed," said Muir. "There will be an annual report, the first one of which will be towards the end of this year. I think this will be an important contribution of ours to the deliberations of the European Council on defence issues at the end of 2013," said Muir.

He continued: "What we want to be able to provide is a clear broad picture. Where are the gaps? Where are the duplications and redundancies? What obstacles have Member States identified in implementing the Code? What is the pan-European effect of defence cuts? Part of this will be a mapping exercise to determine the effect these cuts have on the retaining and developing capabilities. But this isn't just about capabilities — it's also about the impact on research and technology. Although much of our pooling & sharing work lies within our Capabilities Directorate there is a lot on-going in other directorates. But we must work in an integrated manner, which means that our overall approach is coherent."

The first annual report will be a critical milestone in the implementation of the Code of Conduct. Will national differences in attitudes towards methods of achieving this implementation make an objective and impartial report more difficult to achieve? "It is clear there is not a single Member State that is not involved in some form of cooperation with regard to capability development, though to significantly different degrees. We are assuming they have an inventory of these cooperative projects or initiatives and I am therefore pretty sanguine that we will receive meaningful inputs or reports from them," said Muir.

"What will also be useful is to use EDA as a platform of information exchange on bilateral or regional initiatives both to share best practice and facilitate synergies. The result should be a clear picture of the capability map across Europe," said Muir.

How does one define ‘capability’? Would military air traffic control qualify, for example? "Yes I think it probably would," said Muir. "Anything required to enable operations and deliver the necessary military effect is a capability. Some of these are lethal, but there is a huge range of such capabilities that might be less visible, but without which an operation could not succeed. When issues of sovereignty come to the fore it is sometimes easier to get nations to cooperate on capabilities that are not necessarily front line, such as logistics, medical support or training. Cooperating in support functions not only brings efficiencies and economies; it also proves the concept. And it should demonstrate that shared sovereignty does not mean loss of sovereignty," Muir said.

The annual report, when produced towards the end of 2013, will have to answer questions on how it relates to other EU initiatives, particularly the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Muir believes that, in line with the code’s "work in progress" status, the report will address substantive issues at the same time as recognising the need for continual effort. "I would expect to see acknowledgement of the requirement for further work in as yet unidentified areas. This process — especially the capability mapping process — is going to help identify gaps and redundancies. This could help Member States to determine capability development on a coherent basis for the future," he said.

"There is a great degree of solidarity and trust between Member States in terms of operating and fighting alongside each other. The real benefit of the Code of Conduct may eventually be to embed that solidarity and trust within the DNA of Member States so that they also pool & share the very capabilities needed to conduct those operations in the future," he concluded.

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The code of conduct on pooling & sharing

Introduction

The objective of this Code of Conduct is to support cooperative efforts of EU Member States to develop defence capabilities. The actions herein are aimed at mainstreaming pooling & sharing in Member States’ planning and decision-making processes. They are to be implemented on a national and voluntary basis, in line with defence policies of Member States.

Pooling & sharing

1. Systematically consider cooperation from the outset in national defence planning of Member States.
2. Consider pooling & sharing for the whole life-cycle of a capability, including cooperation in R&T, minimising the number of variants of the same equipment, to optimise potential savings, improve interoperability, and rationalise demand.
3. Promote where possible the expansion of national programmes to other Member States to encourage the cooperative development of increased capabilities, and facilitate operational deployment.
4. Share opportunities that could be open to pooling & sharing.
5. Consider the joint use of existing capabilities by Member States to optimise available resources and improve overall effectiveness.

Investment

In accordance with national decision-making processes:

6. When a pooling & sharing project is agreed, endeavour to accord it a higher degree of protection from potential cuts.
7. Harness efficiencies generated through pooling & sharing in order to support further capability development.
8. Endeavour to allocate the necessary investment to support the development of future capabilities, including R&T, taking advantage of synergies with wider European policies, including regulatory frameworks, standards and certification.

Coherence

9. Pursue coherence between regional clusters of cooperation, including bilateral and ongoing multinational initiatives, to avoid major gaps or possible duplication and to share best practice, using EDA as a platform for information exchange.
10. Increase transparency, share expertise and best practice on cooperative capability development and capability priorities among Member States to enhance the opportunities for cooperation and greater interoperability. Mapping of projects open to cooperation would be supported by EDA tools, such as the Capability Development Plan and the database of collaborative opportunities (CoDaBa).
11. Benefit from information through EDA when conducting national defence reviews, for example on pooling & sharing opportunities and the impact of budget cuts (an assessment of possible consequences on the European capability landscape).

Assessment

EDA to submit to Defence Ministers an annual state of play of pooling & sharing, on the basis inter alia of inputs/reports from Member States and the EUMC, focusing on new pooling & sharing opportunities and also comprising an analysis of the capability situation in Europe; progress achieved; obstacles; the impact of defence cuts and possible solutions.
It is one of the biggest challenges facing defence organizations around the world: how can you flexibly manage a vital, strategic military research programme encompassing a host of related but independent technologies – from initial academic research to developing a systems platform – over a long period, when economic conditions and threat environments change? When this challenge is spread across a whole continent the institutional and economic issues become even more complex.

This has been the challenge that EDA has faced with its €53.7 million Unmanned Maritime Systems (UMS) programme, which aims to deliver advanced maritime mine counter-measures and related technologies in the second half of this decade (see also European Defence Matters, issue one, page 32). Its solution has been to develop a flexible, integrated research programme within the research and technology (R&T) Directorate of the Agency, with 14 different projects and encompassing a total of 11 participating Member States (pMS) (see box), each with different areas of interest. In parallel, pMSs have launched Maritime Mine CounterMeasures (MMCM) work in the Armaments Directorate which aims at the common development and procurement of MMCM assets in the shorter term.

From the outset the MMCM work strand has been a ‘live’ exercise, expanding and developing to meet the needs of the participants. “It was initiated within the Capability Directorate in 2008, as MMCM was identified as one of the 12 capability priorities. The idea was to bring nations together to develop further a Common Staff Target already developed at an earlier stage and to prepare for the replacement of MMCM capabilities currently in service in EU nations,” said Bart Stoelinga, Senior Officer For Maritime Programmes. “When the concept was further developed it became obvious we were looking at a stand-off, unmanned solution. We had a number of discussions in the Agency and among pMSs and from the broad idea of an unmanned, stand-off concept a number of projects were identified that would need a technical solution by 2018. The UMS programme was started to work on these different areas (see box).”

Ministers approved the UMS programme as an R&T programme in 2009, but it has evolved considerably over the years. New work strands have been added and others were redefined; this year will see the start of a new work strand on the use of fuel cells in unmanned underwater vehicles while other elements of the work are being extended.

“It's a living programme,” said Jari Hartikainen, Technology Manager R&T Directorate. “Different smaller projects can be introduced by Member States into the wider programme framework to meet their own national interests. This supports specialisation, so small countries can participate in work which reflects their own expertise and it also means these countries, with relatively small budgets, can acquire a great deal of knowledge in this important area of research.”

The aim is to develop technologies, within the R&T programme, which can be carried forward into an Armaments Directorate development project. By closely linking the detailed R&T work with the strategic Capability Development Plan (CDP), which is being constantly updated, the idea is to minimize waste in resources from duplicated research. The CDP gives direction to the work carried out in the programme. The Capability Directorate has carried out a landscaping study on future naval requirements to highlight (future) capability gaps and the R&T Directorate has organised a number of workshops on the strategic research agenda to identify critical areas where
"The idea was to bring nations together to develop further a Common Staff Target already developed at an earlier stage and to prepare for the replacement of MMCM capabilities currently in service in EU nations."

"Unmanned systems are not recognized in international shipping rules, which is a major obstacle against their widespread use."

"which is a major obstacle against their widespread use." Standardization is also an absolute prerequisite for more affordable and more interoperable systems.

Participants in the UMS programme include defence organizations, industry and research institutes. "Studies which require specific scientific or industrial expertise are sometimes launched by EDA on behalf of the member states" said Bart Stoelinga. "So it's not just about technology push. The framework of UMS allows countries to identify opportunities for collaboration in research, which will feed in to their national programmes. Some defence industries may bring technologies that they have developed trying to find solutions to problems in the air and land environment for use in the naval environment. We can capitalise on this."

One of the other major challenges is institutional: trying to find ways to align the budgets of different nations so common funding streams to agreed timelines can be developed, making best use of the collaborative process. Despite the challenges, the flexible, integrated structure of the UMS programme has worked well and EDA is in the first stages of exploring whether a similar structure could be used for research in other areas like mission modular naval ships or unmanned aerial systems."
With any international partner you have to understand in a fair amount of detail how they work – that means understanding both the national and organisational cultures involved,” said David Chinn, who joined the EDA in September 2012 as an Assistant Director of Research and Technology (R&T). “We have to really understand what our Member States are looking for because once you understand that it is much easier to achieve their buy-in for any new capability development project; if you are offering something that is really needed it’s a much easier ‘sell’ than for something which is not required at all.

David’s current responsibility is leading the materials research programme but will take over the air domain R&T in the summer, in charge of working with Member States and European bodies such as the Commission, the European Space Agency (ESA), Eurocontrol and the European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) on coordinating research into future air system capabilities – such as remotely piloted air systems (RPAS). One of his biggest challenges is to ensure he knows the wide range of people working in this area and all their aspirations among the interested organisations.

“In the materials domain I had an educated guess that ESA were doing something quite similar to us, so I made contact with head of materials at ESA and we compared strategic research agendas. It turns out we are doing quite a lot of similar activities so we’re now planning to work together on several areas of common interest. If we can do this ‘active brokering’ with ESA and the Commission’s research activities we can start to ensure there’s coherence at the European level. This is important from the taxpayers’ point of view – if you don’t have people talking to each other you will create unnecessary duplication.”

David Chinn joined the EDA from the UK’s Ministry of Defence’s DES Airworthiness Team (DAT), within the Defence Equipment and Support organisation (DES). An understanding of the challenges and solutions to developing effective international cooperation in defence equipment procurement was gained as an exchange officer in the French Direction Générale de l’Armement, where he

“Where the EDA has its greatest value is playing where there is no national solution”
undertook the French Senior Acquisition course (CHEAr) at the Ecole Militaire, Paris. He then led the interoperability assistance team and subsequently became the lead on UK French technical exchanges under the then recently signed UK-French bilateral treaty.

This meant spending time mapping out how the French and UK defence acquisition agencies worked separately - and how they could best work together. "Understanding how this works in a bilateral context and then a multinational context by working with NATO, too, gave me an important context to my work here. And the Anglo-French bilateral can be seen as a useful motor of collaboration because the UK and France are genuinely interested in pushing forward European defence. At the same time there's a degree of sensitivity involved because it is bilateral and can be seen by some as being somewhat exclusive."

One of the key challenges facing the EDA and its senior staff is to translate high level political commitments to collaborate in areas such as R&T to real, tangible progress within Member States defence departments.

"This is hard because at a policy level each Member State has a different set of drivers," said David Chinn. "Some are hard-nosed military requirements, some are more industrial and others are based around smaller states wanting to have the same capabilities as the larger ones. So there's a whole range of motivations at a policy level. And then you have to deal with the pure mechanics of different nations having different funding cycles, different approval times and processes. If you mistime those then you may receive money from one Member State but lose it at another because you have just moved into another financial year."

"On the plus side even though the EDA is relatively small, with around 120 people, we have a full range of staff covering requirements, contracts and finance, so all the people are in one fairly small building and no more than five minutes away by foot. You can do things amazingly quickly when they line up internally."

One of the EDA's most important roles is to coordinate the work being undertaken by Member States defence departments with parallel activities taking place among European Union organisations - such as developing RPAS operational standards.

"There is a large amount of activity taking place in this area in the civil world, involving departments other than defence," said David Chinn. "Because the whole regulatory framework is still quite immature from airworthiness and air traffic management viewpoints there is an important requirement for EASA and Eurocontrol to become involved. No one national organisation can do this on its own. This industry is moving very quickly - if others move faster than us then they could set the regulatory framework for the industry, which could disadvantage Europe. Where the EDA has its greatest value is playing where there is no national solution."

Profile: David Chinn is an Assistant Director of Research and Technology (R&T), with a background in engineering and international collaboration in defence equipment procurement which allows him to understand the cultural and technical challenges of the job, writes Philip Butterworth-Hayes.

David Chinn originally trained as an engineer and joined the Royal Aircraft Establishment, Farnborough, after graduating from Durham University in 1983. In 1989 he moved to the newly-formed Eurofighter Programme office in London and then to the NATO Eurofighter Management Agency in Munich working on software and systems integration during development and early flight test. Following his return to the UK in 1995 he became the project manager for Electronic Warfare on the Royal Air Force (RAF) Tornado fleet at the time of the major GR4 upgrade programme.

He then became the UK avionics architecture lead in the UK Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) office and was a visiting member of the JSF Joint Program Office in Washington DC during the competition between the X-32 and the X-35.

But the EDA challenge facing David Chinn and his colleagues is as much about understanding the cultural issues, the people involved and their priorities as the technologies.
"It was immediately clear that we didn’t have enough assets in place - but what was even more critical was the high level of fragmentation"
A capability gap in air to air refuelling (AAR) capacity for Europe’s armed forces has been apparent since the Kosovo conflict and was also highlighted in more recent operations over Libya. The challenge lies in turning political support for cooperation into concrete action, writes Tim Mahon

Urgent action under way to provide air tanking capability

AR is a critical enabler for power projection. Recognising this, and appreciating the evidence of a shortfall in current capability, defence ministers from ten European states signed a letter of intent, during the EDA Steering Board meeting on 19 November 2012, to work together to boost their military AAR capacity and capability. Europe currently fields 42 tanker aircraft of ten different types: the US, by comparison, 650 aircraft of four variants. Previous dependence on Fogging capability.

The obvious answer is to determine the feasibility of many nations acquiring common assets. Given the difference in perceived requirements and resources, however, this is not quite as simple a solution as it might seem. The fact that both the UK and France, for example, have selected the Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) as the basis for their new AAR fleets offers great capacity for commonality and interoperability in the future, but these are national, unilateral programmes. The possibility of similar unilateral action to procure interoperable assets, or the creation of a programme in which assets can be fielded in common, needs examination and careful consideration.

He confirmed that the Libyan crisis had highlighted certain aspects of the capability gap. "It was immediately clear that we didn't have enough assets in place - but what was even more critical was the high level of fragmentation," he said. The discipline of AAR means that a tanker has to be certified to provide services to a receiving aircraft. With ten different types of tanker in Europe and as many as two types of receiving aircraft, the problem of lack of AAR clearances has placed a huge strain on the planning processes. "This led to a very low level of efficiency, which was a severe problem," said Donnet. "The first conclusion, therefore, was that whatever level of improvement we are able to bring - whether in the short, medium or long term - needs to overcome this fragmentation issue."

The first conclusion, therefore, was that whatever level of improvement we are able to bring - whether in the short, medium or long term - needs to overcome this fragmentation issue. The obvious answer is to determine the feasibility of many nations acquiring common assets. Given the difference in perceived requirements and resources, however, this is not quite as simple a solution as it might seem. The fact that both the UK and France, for example, have selected the Airbus A330 Multi-Role Tanker Transport (MRTT) as the basis for their new AAR fleets offers great capacity for commonality and interoperability in the future, but these are national, unilateral programmes. The possibility of similar unilateral action to procure interoperable assets, or the creation of a programme in which assets can be fielded in common, needs examination and careful consideration.

"We have about 170 aircraft coming, but only 29 AAR kits. So let's look at the acquisition of more pods, more AAR kits"

Laurent Donnet
Assistant Capability Manager, EDA

Even this, however, would not necessarily address the immediate issue of how to cure the capability shortfall in the short term. As Donnet explains, "Even if you agree to procure a new asset now, in 2012, you are not going to have them in full service before 2020. So the short term issue remains a fundamental one."

In establishing the framework within which to address the short term issue, discussions between the EDA and NATO – to ensure there was no conflict between the pooling & sharing initiative and the work NATO is conducting under the 'smart defence' banner – resulted in an agreement that the AAR work would be headed by EDA, since it was already further ahead in determining possible solutions. According to Donnet it quickly became clear there were only two short term solutions – with 'short term' in this context being defined as the provision of new capability within 12 months. One was the Lockheed Martin C-130J and the other a single commercial AAR provider – Omega Air – operating Boeing 707s and KC-10s. "No nation showed interest for the C-130J option and while there might have been some interest in taking the commercial AAR route we felt there was some resistance from the military to adopting such a solution," he said.

Nevertheless, Omega Air, with three aircraft, adds a capability increase of almost ten per cent to the existing European tanker fleet. Donnet believes there are some methods by which the Omega Air fleet could be used to free up existing operational capacity by using it for the essential need for aircrew training – both for tankers and receivers as well as for training deployments. "The Libyan crisis demonstrated the need for continual training and using commercial aircraft to provide this – for example, in the Red Flag and Maple Flag exercises in the US – would bring identifiable benefits, perhaps. We are hoping for one large nation to take on the pivotal role of seeing whether this works – hopefully during 2013; taking up the major portion of the available hours on those tankers to see if we can move beyond this resistance – a proof of the concept, if you will."

The second pillar of the Agency’s work focuses on the medium term, where the fundamental issue is to examine how to make better use of the...
existing fleet and cater for the arrival of new airframes into the air order of battle in coming years. There are four separate work strands involved in this aspect of the task.

First is an examination of the most effective potential use of the MRTTs as they come into service. European Air Transport Command is examining this subject, looking at the optimisation of the MRTT, which requires different approaches to planning, tasking and logistic support than has been the case up till now.

The second work strand revolves around the Italian fleet of four KC-767 tankers. “The process of certifying the aircraft is a lengthy one, but is fundamentally about exchange of technical data and paperwork. So we decided to see whether processing all that paperwork and data through EDA could ease the medium term issue by organising a collective AAR clearance trial that can be exploited for the future,” said Donnet. The Italian case would thereby become the ‘pilot case,’ offering the ability for nations operating the same type of receiving aircraft to clear them for KC-767 operations, but also to use the process for future tankers, such as the A400M, the UK’s Voyager and France’s MRTT and so on.

The third issue is one of diplomatic clearance. Every time there is a deployment of aircraft that will require tankers to cross national borders – for example, the recent deployment of French Rafales from France to Mali – the formal clearance and authorisation for over-flights needs to be undertaken. Every nation’s procedure is different and can sometimes inject unacceptable delays into the planning and deployment processes. So the EDA is seeking to harmonise and optimise these procedures – at least in European skies – to facilitate clearance for both training and operational requirements.

The final strand revolves around the UK MRTT Voyager programme and the possibility for the fleet to offer spare capacity to European partners from 2015. “We want to discuss as early as possible exactly how we can optimise this capability. For example, there is an A330 simulator and other training facilities at Brize Norton, the sharing of which could be invaluable,” Donnet said.

The discipline of AAR means that a tanker has to be certified to provide services to a receiving aircraft. With ten different types of tanker in Europe and at least as many types of receiving aircraft, the problem of lack of AAR clearances has placed a huge strain on the tasking and planning processes.

A third major pillar of the Agency’s work focuses on the A400M aircraft, which offers what Donnet terms ‘plug and play’ AAR capability, meaning that the differences in technical issues will largely disappear. “We have about 170 aircraft coming, but only 29 AAR kits. So let’s look at the acquisition of more pods, more AAR kits,” said Donnet. Solutions being examined include common procurement, acquisition of a European ‘pool’ of kits for common use, or even leasing of kits from industry.

The last major pillar, which Donnet describes as the most important, certainly from the financial perspective, examines the acquisition of strategic tanker capability by 2020. The ten nations signing the letter of intent last November have given a clear mandate for the development and acquisition of this capability, and regular meetings facilitated by EDA are now taking place to define an unambiguous requirement, an agreed concept of operations and a Memorandum of Understanding.

It is too early to state with any certainty which method of procurement might be selected. “We might take the same route as for the SAC C-17 fleet, for example, or look at one nation owning the aircraft on behalf of the partner nations, or perhaps OCCAR could become the procurement agency,” Donnet said, adding that “the more important issue is to have an agreed concept of operations, however, in parallel with which we are developing the requirements specification so that we can have a request for quotation ready, perhaps, by the end of this year.”

It is clear, according to Donnet, that in order to achieve a 2020 in service date, a commercial-off-the-shelf (COTS) solution will be required. “The choices are therefore somewhat limited; we have the Airbus A330 MRTT, the Boeing KC767/KC-46 and one or two commercial companies providing conversion programmes for existing airframes,” he said.

There has been enormous and hard-won political momentum added to the mix during 2012 and that needs to be turned into positive, concrete action as quickly as possible – which is why the EDA is pursuing the several pillars of assessment and development in parallel. Building flexibility in to the process from the start will be key to efficiently meeting short term and long term shortfalls in this critical area of defence capability.
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What do you believe should be done to strengthen and enhance the European defence industrial base? How can institutions such as the EDA contribute effectively to this process?

The core role of the EDA is to help governments attain their defence objectives by outlining the efficiency gains that could be a result of doing things together. But Member States all come from different horizons and do not in all cases have homogenous security and defence policy goals. So convergence has to be created in a pragmatic way. Mostly, and particularly in this field, Europe is forging common approaches through dealing with crisis situations. And the European Union does not see itself as a prime military power and understandably prefers to seek foreign and security policy benefits by using ‘soft-power’ approaches. However we seem to be entering a period where we are witnessing a rising tension between not being a prime military power yet still being able to support doing the things we need and want to do to maintain a credible European foreign and security policy posture.

Surely the current one-by-one policy where we shop around between ourselves for assets during times of crisis – such as military transport aircraft – is not an optimised process. These crises can give us some guidelines to the future but we need to consider the equipment implications of these events becoming more prolonged and difficult, with increased demand for equipment. We need to consider what exactly we should be doing jointly and whether we have the technology investment in place for the longer term. Or whether we just go down commercial routes, that is, look for what is available, accepting the inevitable dependencies that this would create.

The degree to which Member States achieve demand consolidation though harmonization, coordination and synchronization of their individual procurement initiatives is key to the preservation of a healthy defence industrial base in Europe.

Member States have to define those defence areas which they need to retain under their direct influence to serve an immediate national interest and then agree collaborative approaches for the rest. There should be room within the EDA for this collaborative process to start and for governments, whether it is two or 27, to identify similar needs and discuss how to achieve the capabilities together. A key issue is agreeing a common timescale, to coordinate and synchronise national budgets. You can then develop an optimised investment plan from research and technology to actual procurement. Does this mean a single procurement agency for Europe? Maybe in the very long term but we can go a long way in the short term to synchronise approaches. We know this has provided benefits in the past. For example, with the Meteor air-to-air missile programme governments drew up common specifications, including those for the interfaces, and agreed to place orders in the same timeframe, but individually. This allowed the contractor the opportunity to benefit from a larger production run, with an appropriate reduced level of cost to the customer.

We see no reasonable prospect in the foreseeable future of the EU itself becoming a significant source of demand for defence goods and services - the fundamental challenges and responsibilities continue to reside in Member States. But we think the full potential of the EDA is not yet recognised by Member States and the Agency will have to market itself more proactively.

Industry was very much in support of the creation of the EDA and, although we do not in all questions share identical views, now more than ever we need to work more closely together. The EDA’s role for industry is essential but the Agency has to focus on speeding up the schedule under which cooperative initiatives are being delivered, to drill down into the wide process of pooling & sharing and identify more initiatives that are directly relevant to underpin defence industrial capabilities in Europe. Time is of the essence, now more than ever.

Surely we also need a well regulated European defence market but it cannot be created by regulation alone. Even if we have the same transparent rules for procurement and competition, without demand consolidation fragmentation endures. And who does that help?

Is Europe investing enough in research and technology (R&T) and if not, what can be done to reverse the decline?

Our mastery of technologies is an essential part of our industrial capability portfolio. Much of this capability has been generated by government
investment from research to procurement, and governments should have an overwhelming interest in maintaining the competitiveness of “their” industries. But the paradigm is changing. We are – we hope – moving towards a European, rather than a national defence market, and additionally there is a real benefit for our Member States if companies can maintain or enhance their global competitive edge. If industry is competitive in Europe, it will be competitive globally and vice-versa.

In former times, governments had their national industries’ interests at heart, but if you widen the procurement circle to include other participating governments, those same companies need to be sure the new government customers will also respect their justifiable interests, in particular in the domain of Intellectual Property rights (IPR). Each company’s IPR portfolio after all is a key ingredient in its global competitiveness.

In 2006 EU defence ministers in the EDA Steering Board agreed they should increase the percentage of research and technology in defence budgets from 1.6% to 2.0%. But EDA’s figures for 2010 showed it has fallen to 1.2%, and today the figure is certainly lower. This does indeed represent structural under-investment. There is no doubt that the accelerating and enduring erosion of defence industrial capabilities will have serious consequences for the security and defence policies that they help to sustain. What may be even worse is that there is no common view of which are the essential capabilities that will be needed over the next two decades; without this view it’s impossible to say whether, if you lose capabilities, this will result in a dangerous situation or not.

Defence research and technology investment is undertaken by Member States in view of a capability need and is usually full-funded because they have an upcoming capability need and there’s nothing in the portfolio to meet that need. So they work with industry to create that capability. This process will continue but we now face important questions of affordability. Member States will increasingly have to coordinate this with other Member States – though there will still be instances of some governments undertaking work on an exclusively national basis – and coordination will typically be done through the EDA. This is an EDA capability, which is currently under-exploited in our view, especially for Category B programmes. This is a valuable resource and Member States should have more recognition of them and be more open to coordinate their approaches.

It is clear that not all Member States have gone down the process of understanding what they want to share and what they don’t want to share – from both research and procurement points of view.

Across the institutional divide the EDA and the European Commission now have a tool to coordinate their investments in research and technology to prevent waste and duplication. But the Commission undertakes R&T work at a lower-tier technical readiness levels from that of the EDA - the higher you go towards technical readiness the closer you move towards putting that new technology into the defence market and that’s not an area in which the Commission operates. The Commission can help through its framework research agenda with the first steps of technology research that is relevant to future defence capabilities, but not exclusively so, and then it’s up to Member States and the EDA to develop the more defence specific technology. This is a process which needs to be better coordinated; the Commission also funds this work differently and makes the results freely available within the EU and sometimes beyond, which is mostly not appropriate for the defence sector. The related IPR issues are another factor – rules for intellectual property use are different for work which is funded through the grant mechanism (on the Commission’s side) as opposed to defence research investments by the Member States.

So how does Europe remain competitive in a market that is increasingly global and in which buyers are becoming far more intelligent in terms of procurement practices?

The fall in product demand and increasing under-investment in R&T among European Member States are causing companies to seek market opportunities in more dynamic economies in an effort both to sustain profitable activities and maintain their defence industrial capabilities. But the European defence industrial community can only be sustainably successful in foreign markets if it can demonstrate that there is a national and/or EU home market for their products. Home customer demand has always been a
pre-requisite for successful defence exporting. There are constraints to marketing globally - we cannot do it everywhere and we do not want to do it everywhere. In addition, many potential foreign customers expect genuine cooperation and industrial investment. So, by seeking to exploit foreign markets, we contribute to creating our competitors of the future.

Then there is the problem of technology drain. These new competitors will not want an investment in yesterday's technologies; they want to create their own capabilities. So suddenly you can create a 'reverse dependency' situation where politically acceptable countries acquire technological capabilities on which Europe may soon start to depend. These implications have to be properly thought through.

What effect do you forecast from the activities of Commissioner Barnier and the Task Force on defence? How much input has ASD had in these activities?

The task force, as we interpret it, is there to help. It wants to help governments achieve the objectives they have set for themselves. While we welcome the Commission's interest in supporting the defence sector, the actions available to or suggested by the Commission are not central to the underlying problems faced by the industry in the short and medium term, and need to be seen and understood in this context.

What do you see as the priorities for European defence in light of the EU Council's workings? How important will the EU ministerial meeting on defence be at the end of this year?

In terms of raising to the level of heads of government the issue that there is more to European security and defence policy than the external aspect, the council meeting is extremely important. We have started our dialogue with the EDA and the Commission to ensure all arguments can be brought forward. We have tried the 'bottom-up' approach but to achieve real progress, what Europe really needs now is the 'top-down' focus and support by Heads of State and Governments.

Consolidation in the European defence industry is a hot topic, with the failed merger of EADS and BAE Systems and rumours regarding mergers within French industry bringing a fresh focus to it. What is your view on the imperative for consolidation and the barriers that stand in the way of making it effective?

Our association is not working on consolidation scenarios. These are issues where each company has its own strategy and its own portfolio of interests and those are extremely competition-sensitive. I can only offer you a few general considerations. 'Consolidation' has become a buzz-word for journalists and analysts - it covers many underlying issues, which many people who use the word do not probably fully understand. It is important to understand that consolidation, in particular in our industry sector, is a result of market conditions and political concerns that are fully under control of the EU Member States.

"We need to consider what exactly we should be doing jointly and whether we have the technology investment in place for the longer term"

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The notion of European states working together on equipment issues to generate military capabilities that they could not otherwise afford dates back to the earliest collaborative development and production projects. Significantly, ‘routine’ collaborative projects enabled the national operation and modification of assets that had been collectively developed. The pooling & sharing approach, in contrast, means individual states should rely on a wider group for the continuous provision of some assets and capabilities, as has been the case since the mid-1980s with the NATO AWACS (airborne warning and control system) fleet.

The EDA and its members have developed a significant list of candidate projects for pooling & sharing and more initiatives may well emerge. But what criteria might be used to assess a proposal’s prospect of success?
Experience and reflection suggest that candidates for pooling & sharing should possess some and preferably several positive attributes. However, not all what might be seen as pressures encouraging deeper cooperation are entirely compatible.

Desirable features for pooling & sharing projects

The capabilities concerned should:

**Be of clear utility in the modern world.** This is a statement of the blindingly obvious but one which serves to underline relevance to pooling & sharing of projects that support force projection and are relevant to a number of military tasks. Surveillance, air transport and global communications capabilities have been seen to be repeatedly valuable in the post-Cold War World and are fields but are not yet well represented in European forces. However States unenthusiastic about force projection and general sceptical of such mission’s chances of political success, could well be wary in this area. Some European countries have concerns about the long-term orientation of Russia.

**Require significant capital investment** which any single state would struggle to afford. The types of systems that fall into this category are growing and this heading covers virtually all major platforms and weapons systems. The ability to share capital costs have been a driving behind numerous collaborative projects including Typhoon and the A400M. Training facilities too, with their need for a mix of simulators and actual systems, are growing in cost and cooperation is therefore increasing in appeal. Finally some test facilities for advanced technologies would fall into this category. Although not involving a formal defence system, Europeans’ collective readiness to invest in the Galileo satellite system gives some encouragement for the idea of shared space systems.

**Be seen as reliably available,** especially for a military operation. This is a function of whether it would be judged to be easy or difficult for partner governments to accept an asset’s use on a military operation undertaken by perhaps only one or two European countries. There is cause for concern because within Europe there is often disagreement about the propriety or success prospects for the use of military force. The German stance on Libya in 2011 is just the most recent illustration. Three factors would appear particularly relevant.

- If equipment is unlikely to be lost in operations: unsure governments are more likely to go along if they feel that the physical and financial risks to them are low. Surveillance and global communications systems and transport and air tanker projects would score well here. So would non-front line capabilities such as shared training assets.
- If the equipment does not directly cause kinetic effects and thus deaths and property destruction: again wavering governments unsure would be more likely to cooperate if assets with which they were associated did not involve the political fall-out that can be associated with deaths and physical damage.
- Involve relatively few personnel: military operations put people at risk so assets that involve few people are more likely to be made available that structures that are personnel heavy.

The relevance of all three of these considerations could
be seen in the 1990s when Germany, still reluctant to use its forces beyond its own territory, allowed German personnel on NATO AWACs aircraft to remain and be deployed over the Balkans.

**Be associated with economies of scale** during development, production and in the in-service phase. Debates over Typhoon and the A400M have underlined the costs of operating national support systems with the limited scale of ordering of parts and the duplication of expensive test and diagnostic equipment. As the electronic element in defence systems increases, obsolescence management becomes an ever larger challenge. Clearly training and test facilities are subject to economies of scale if a national government alone does not use them at anything like full capacity.

**Involve the maintenance and improvement of existing capabilities** rather than radical new ones. Human organisations in general and militaries in particular have often a preference for the familiar over the unknown and the organisationally disruptive. Moreover, psychologists have frequently shown that we are loss averse, that is to say people tend to place more weight on the prospective loss of something that is already in their possession than on something which is merely a prospect. This consideration would also suggest that the UK and France, and other larger European states, might be readier to accept pooling & sharing: as states which are accustomed to having a broad and even full spectrum of military capabilities, it is they that face losing their international military status as a result of the growing costs of equipment and failing budgets.

Smaller states on the other hand might well be interested in arrangements that mean they do not have to give up areas of capability that they already possess. The Belgian and Dutch cooperation on both surface ships and submarines shows the extent that governments can accept shared facilities, in this case to retain naval capabilities. Finally, there is no sign that European governments are yet ready to spend more on defence: if pooling & sharing projects are not to have to push ‘national’ projects out of existing defence plans, they should focus on areas where some provision might well have been made.

**Have widespread industrial and technological benefit** and not just support the economies of the countries that have large defence industrial sectors. As the member states of OCCAR have recognised, the distribution of economic benefits should be seen on a portfolio basis with multiple projects in view: ‘juste retour’ on individual projects is significantly discredited. However, with pooling & sharing the economic benefits would not just involve development and production work but also support, training and operating installations. It is largely helpful that major defence industrial businesses in Europe are now organised on a transnational basis with the leadership of companies such EADS, Thales, Finmeccanica and MBDA being accustomed of the opportunities and challenges of operating in several European states. Extensive pooling & sharing arrangements might require a rethink for some UK firms, with their established enthusiasm for investing in the US, but even these firms have many European links through collaborative projects such as Typhoon and the A400M.

A further consideration in this field is that the shared ownership of assets developed and produced in the USA will be of variable appeal in Europe. It might well be that, as with the AWACs fleet, the UK and France will be generally unenthusiastic. They have often been ready to buy from the US and that will remain so, but they could well prefer to make bilateral arrangements with Washington in such cases. NATO’s Smart Defence initiative, so similar in concept to pooling & sharing, does suffer from fears that it may be largely a marketing ploy to promote European purchases of American technology.

**Conclusion**

Clearly not all these factors are pushing in quite the same direction. Political reality is that nation states in Europe are becoming relatively weaker in global military rankings but this seems to matter more in some capitals than others. Also, many European governments have had more than 60 years’ psychological experience of depending on the USA and a switch to relying more on each will never be easy. Even when a military operation has been deemed justified across the Europe, as was the case over Kuwait in 1991, governments can often differ on the risks and costs that they are willing to bear. Pooling & sharing’s appeal to some could be that it offers the prospect of assured access to radical new sorts of capability whereas others will be more interested in sustaining what they have.

The EDA concept makes good economic and sense as a means of enhancing the capability that European countries generate from their defence funds. However, as the rise of behavioural economics has demonstrated, human beings and human organisations are much more complex than homo economicus with many other considerations, including emotions, affecting their decisions.

Moreover, any advances are likely to appear somewhat untidy, with different projects having somewhat different memberships and sponsors: France, Germany and Italy have made progress in developing a collective space surveillance capability but the UK, with its traditional access to (and dependence on) American information, is unlikely to join this in the foreseeable future. Yet there are reasons for optimism, not least that the list of candidates for pooling & sharing has become so extensive and varied, evidence in itself that the concept is being properly explored.

The challenge for officials over the next six months or so will be assemble a package (‘portfolio’) of projects that will give confidence to the heads of European governments when they meet to discuss defence cooperation at the end of the year that there is something in it for all or at least many of them. Accelerated progress would then be a much stronger possibility.
What motivated EU governments to equip the Union with an institutional framework for a common security and defence policy? At first glance, it might seem a strange question to ask given the multitude of obvious responses. The end of the Cold War, the depredations of the Yugoslav succession wars, the step change in European integration, and the changes in Western expectations summed up in the promise of a ‘new world order’ may all make the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) appear an obvious response. Yet the CSDP was created only in 1999, and the operations that the EU carried out in this framework were essentially interventions of choice, begging the question - why? What are the drivers behind the CSDP?

My dissertation explores the causes behind the EU’s recent forays into peace- and state-building operations. Whereas a number of studies have sought to understand the purpose behind the CSDP by analysing its historical roots, institutional features, or the rhetoric of various EU politicians, this dissertation is based on the idea that the drivers behind the policy are most plausibly revealed by looking at what the EU actually does in the CSDP framework. The most significant result of the CSDP, it argues, have been the crisis management operations that the EU has carried out on three continents.

To examine their underlying drivers, it selects four operations and studies the underlying diplomatic history - who wanted what, when, and why. It then uses this systematic reconstruction of the proximate reasons for the Union’s activities in the realm of crisis management to compare the plausibility of different interpretations of the drivers behind the CSDP at large.

The four EU operations I analyze are the military operations in Bosnia and Chad/Central African Republic and the civilian missions in Kosovo and Afghanistan, thereby mirroring the spread of CSDP operations in terms of objectives and geographic distribution while capturing the most significant efforts to date in terms of operation size, cost and political risk. In seeking to explain the collective, EU motivation behind each operation, the dissertation systematically gathers the positions of the British, French and German governments. Apart from their alleged influence in the EU, these governments cover the range of what are probably the most important cleavages dividing national security policies in Europe: their respective preferences for or against association with Washington by default; their relative enthusiasm for robust interventions beyond Europe’s borders; and their diverging willingness to see the EU take a greater role in foreign policy-making. The positions of other EU member states are covered wherever they played a significant role in the decision-making for a given operation. Some 70 interviews in Brussels as well as in Berlin, Paris, and London helped shed light on national preferences regarding CSDP operations and their impact on EU decision-making. These empirical cases are then used to assess the relative

Why has the European Union intervened in certain international crises but not others? The First EDA-Egmont PhD Prize in European Defence, Security and Strategy has been awarded to Dr Benjamin Pohl for his work to find the answer to this important question.

The drivers behind EU crisis management operations
explanatory power of four competing propositions derived from the explanations prevalent in the academic literature.

Tracing the diplomatic history of the four crisis management operations, the dissertation evaluates the motives of the French, British and German governments for each case in order to identify the logic that underpinned pivotal national approaches to the CSDP. It finds that Paris was especially concerned about getting the CSDP operational and about keeping it distinct from NATO, a motive particularly visible with respect to the operation in Bosnia, but with repercussions for Afghanistan as well. This concern over the transatlantic security architecture has traditionally been linked to French objectives of balancing the US, but can more plausibly be traced to the government’s interest in playing to domestic expectations regarding France’s specific role in the world. Such an interpretation is suggested not only by the substantial agreement and collaboration between Paris and Washington regarding international objectives in all four theatres, but also by the role that domestic politics played for the operation in Chad.

British objectives by contrast featured substantial efforts to keep CSDP closely tied into NATO. Underlying this transatlantic bias was a strategy for wielding international influence that had London systematically seek proximity to Washington. Yet this proximity was also the result of New Labour’s embrace of the ‘special relationship’ as a means of signalling electability. That domestic politics beat foreign policy is suggested by London’s limited support for CSDP operations even where the latter clearly had a pro-US orientation. The British strategy of exhorting the EU to become more active internationally while not fully engaging also chimed well with the Eurosceptic disposition of its electorate.

Finally, the German government also used CSDP operations to demonstrate its willingness to support US foreign policy, if with lesser enthusiasm than its British counterpart. Simultaneously, it sought to further CSDP for the purpose of advancing European integration more broadly. When political risks beckoned, however, it has subordinated both goals to the (perceived) exigencies of domestic politics.

The dissertation concludes by appraising the plausibility of four putative explanations for CSDP action. It finds, first, that ESDP operations were not used to balance the US. To the contrary, three out of the four operations covered in this book coincided with US interest in CSDP action, and none was opposed by Washington. Both British and German officials cited US expectations of EU engagement as major reasons for undertaking CSDP operations. Secondly, the objective of promoting liberal values influenced CSDP action, but was usually secondary and qualified. All four operations were embedded into broader Western foreign policy projects that sought to either strengthen the rule of law and/or protect vulnerable individuals.

Yet the proximate causes for the operations’ launch were regional stability and/or EU governments’ foreign policy credibility. The EU’s self-conception as a ‘force for good’ was thus refracted through calculations of anticipated political costs and benefits. A more convincing explanation is that EU governments pursued the creation of an EU security identity as an objective in itself, i.e. that they engaged in CSDP operations for the purpose of showing that the EU was able and willing to act in the domain of international security. And yet, EU action in the CSDP framework was not primarily driven by a ‘European’ nation-building agenda.

EU
governments simply expended too little effort to advertise the Union’s contribution to international security for this idea to hold.

Against the backdrop of these three explanations, the fourth, the perceived exigencies of domestic politics, provides the most plausible explanation for the CSDP record. What the EU did (and did not do) in the framework of the CSDP was above all what EU governments believed their societies would accept and expect from them in terms of international security policy – under the constraints that institutionalized multilateral cooperation implied. Thus, this dissertation challenges the gist of much traditional international relations theory with its emphasis on external pressures and assumptions about a primacy of foreign policy over domestic politics. Rather than being based on considerations of relative external power, CSDP operations were embedded into a larger aspiration that Europeans shared with North Americans: the stabilization if not expansion of an international liberal order based on individual rights and the rule of law.

Although partly self-interested, this shared objective was rooted more in (trans-)national role conceptions than geopolitical constraints. The pursuit of liberal order was however constrained by its very source. Whereas it fed on domestic expectations that European governments do something to improve the world, it was also hampered by a lack of trust on the part of governments that the public would (continue to) support ambitious foreign policy objectives.

The EDA-Egmont PhD Prize

Benjamin Pohl received the first EDA-Egmont PhD Prize in European Defence, Security and Strategy at the EDA annual conference on March 21, 2013, where he presented the results of his dissertation.

The EDA-Egmont PhD Prize in European defence, security and strategy is intended to encourage and stimulate European research in the context of European defence and security. The award targets the findings of research that have been carried out in the framework of a defended and approved doctoral thesis at a recognised academic institution in a Member State of the European Defence Agency.

The Prize aims to connect frontline research with European policy-making mechanisms, making it a truly significant award. The Prize is awarded by the EDA in partnership with the Royal Institute for International Relations, or Egmont Institute, an independent think-tank based in Brussels.

Jury members comprise:
- Prof Sven Biscop (Jury Chair), Director of the Europe in the World Programme, Egmont Institute
- Ms Claude-France Arnould, Chief Executive, EDA
- Dr Antonio Missiroli, Director, EUISS
- Gen Patrick de Rousiers, Chairman, EUMC
- Prof Jolyon Howorth, Jean Monnet Professor of European Politics, University of Bath, and Visiting Professor of Political Science, Yale University
- Dr Hilmar Linnenkamp, Advisor, Research Division International Security, SWP
- Prof Richard Whitman, Professor of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent

Apart from a generous financial award and the opportunity to speak in front of an international audience of senior decision-makers at the EDA Annual Conference the winner is also offered the opportunity to publish the winning thesis as a book. A revised version of his dissertation will be published by Routledge later this year, under the title “EU Foreign Policy and Crisis Management Operations: Power, Purpose and Domestic Politics.”

Chairman of the Jury, Professor Sven Biscop

"Some 70 interviews in Brussels as well as in Berlin, Paris, and London helped shed light on national preferences regarding CSDP operations and their impact on EU decision-making"
T he concept of ‘Pooling & Sharing’ now holds a central space in the debates on a future European defence. Its aim is not only to generate a cost-saving effect in times of austerity; Europe’s credibility through an increased capability and deployability is at stake. We need to strengthen military cooperation to speak with a strong and common voice in this increasingly globalizing world. It is expected of us that we are able to ensure peace and stability in our own backyard. Up to a certain level, we are successful in this. But recent operations have also demonstrated several important shortfalls in terms of strategic enablers.

A complementary approach

If we want to see concrete results in the short term, we need to adopt both a top-down as a bottom-up approach. One of the actions to take is to strive for an alignment of our national defence planning with multinational European defence needs. In order to translate a pro-active top-down policy into action, all principal actors (MOD’s, CHOD’s and even Heads of States) should convene on a more regular basis to discuss how they can coordinate military needs. At the same time, a bottom-up approach should focus on specific deficiencies that we witness in operations. The mixture of these two approaches will allow us to make real progress. Member countries will be incited to join cooperation projects, whenever they offer practical solutions to real problems. In turn, each cooperation initiative contributes to the creation of a common framework.

Specialize and Share

In the future, European Armed Forces will increasingly lean towards specialization. This trend fits into the vision of a common European Defence policy, but only if combined with multilateral purchases of highly specialised military capabilities. This brings us to the issue of sovereignty. It goes without saying that, when it comes to joint purchases, a contributing country will have to compromise on its national autonomy. But this must not slow us down. The European Member States have succeeded in establishing a strong cooperation on so many levels (the political, economic, social and monetary). Nothing keeps us from doing the same in the field of defence and security. Transnational threats also mean that, in a way, the sovereignty that we have to safeguard is shared, and pooled sovereignty means shared responsibility. Furthermore, it is far better to have collective capabilities, rather than unsustainable or non-existent national ones. The message is clear: Pool it or lose it!

Europe’s defence industry

Another attention point is the European defence industry. Most European forces still use very different military equipment, what inhibits close cooperation. We must not only pay more attention to the joint purchase of equipment; defence-industry can help us by better coordinating among them. They will also reap the benefits of this. Larger projects mean larger clientele. We must also focus on the recently enhanced cooperation between EDA and OCCAR and we have to push more actively for the liberalization of the European defence market. To achieve this purpose we must better employ the tools at our disposal, more particularly the European guidelines which can make this possible. An endgame of this scenario for all its frontline actors should be the strengthening of the European Defence Technological and Industrial Base. From the beginning until the end of this process, civil-military synergies must be exploited to their fullest extent.

Conclusion

The further development of a European defence is a must rather than an option. Important progress has been made: we are on the right track; but just as Rome wasn’t built in a day, fostering and developing a strong common European defence will not only take time, but will also require the full commitment from each one of us. It is up to us to ensure that the European Council Meeting at the end of this year will be another milestone in our striving for a stronger Common Security and Defence Policy.
"The European Council on Defence meeting in December will provide the Union, for the first time in four years, with the opportunity to address defence related issues at the highest political level"

Alan Shatter
Ireland’s Minister for Justice, Equality and Defence

Page 10

Key Quotes

"We need to provide the EDA with some serious money and some serious instruments to drive forward decisions"

Tom Enders, Chief Executive of the European Aeronautics Defence & Space Company (EADS)

Page 12

"European defence matters. And to the members of the European Council, the 27 Presidents and Prime Ministers that I represent, it matters tremendously. It matters for the security of our citizens and our home countries, and to uphold our interests and values in the world. It matters because of the jobs, the cutting edge technologies, the potential for growth that collectively you represent."

Herman Van Rompuy
President of the European Council

Page 15

70% of defence research and technology efforts have civil applications

Page 13

"There is a great degree of solidarity and trust between Member States in terms of operating and fighting alongside each other. The real benefit of the Code of Conduct may eventually be to embed that solidarity and trust within the DNA of Member States so that they also pool and share the very capabilities needed to conduct those operations in the future."

Graham Muir, Head of the Policy and Planning Unit at the EDA

Page 26

"It’s a living programme. Different smaller projects can be introduced by Member States into the wider programme framework to meet their own national interests. This supports specialisation, so small countries can participate in work which reflects their own technology levels and it also means these countries, with relatively small budgets, can acquire a great deal of knowledge in this important area of research."

Jari Hartikainen, EDA Technology Manager R&T Directorate

Page 28

Europe’s military spends around €1 billion a year on energy, the same as a small European state.

Page 26

Advertisers index

- Airbus Military
- Outside back cover
- European Defence Agency
- 35, Inside back cover
- Eurosam
- Inside front cover
- MASA
- 4
- Nexter
- 38
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*Figures from the International Committee of the Red Cross.*