Mme Mogherini, Ministers, dear Jorge, ladies and gentlemen

GOOD MORNING.

It's a pleasure and AN HONOUR to be here with you today, as Chairman of the EUMC.

Last year, in the same venue, we analysed together all the opportunities provided by unmanned and autonomous systems.

Today, we welcome a MUCH MORE CHALLENGING TOPIC, which forces us to TAKE A BREAK, evaluate ourselves and look ahead.

I just got back from the BERLIN SECURITY CONFERENCE, as many of you know, a truly interesting forum, with a clear defence industry footprint, OF COURSE.

Inter alia, one of the takeaways was definitely the appeal by many for a HEALTH CHECK OF OUR STRATEGIES.

Additionally, we heard the call for seriously CONTINUE THE RESEARCH OR THE DEVELOPMENT of those capabilities
considered necessary for the **EFFECTIVENESS** of our missions and operations, therefore for the implementation of those strategies.

- Finally, in Berlin we highlighted the need to **COMMUNICATE THE URGE TO INTERVENE** at the roots of the causes of instability and terrorism, inviting Member States to **CONTRIBUTE MORE SUBSTANTIALLY** to our CSDP activities.

- *This morning, in earlier discussions, I think we already received some very valuable point of views, in this regards, like:*

  1. __________________________________________________

- Having said that, I must say that when we speak about Defence Cooperation, **ONE PARTICULAR DETAIL EMERGES CLEARLY** about the role that we play, as military, in the overall process.

- It’s a **DOUBLE ROLE**, in fact: at **TACTICAL** level, on one side, and at **STRATEGIC** level, on the other side.

- At the **TACTICAL** level, we are the **MAIN CUSTOMERS AND PRIMARY USERS** of those processes, with **GREAT EXPECTATIONS** for the prompt delivery of all those capabilities essential to EU strategic autonomy and for the effectiveness of our CSDP activities.

- But as military leadership, we also have a **VITAL ROLE** at **STRATEGIC** level, in all the initiatives and mechanisms stemming from the Global Strategy.

- Our **CONTINUOUS AND UNFETTERED MILITARY ADVICE**, in fact, is critical **TO TRANSLATE** the political Level of Ambition into **MILITARY REQUIREMENTS**, with suitable
priority levels, supporting the EU and the MS decision making, providing a realistic feedback about the feasibility (or not) of CSDP tasks, in coherence with the Global Strategy.

- In this context, among other engagements, the MC I chair conducted the **EU HEADLINE GOAL PROCESS**, a fundamental step to identify those capabilities and derived capability shortfalls.

- The Headline Goal Process, in turn, delivered the **PROGRESS CATALOGUE 2018**, including the so-called **HIGH IMPACT CAPABILITY GOALS**.

- **IN FEW WORDS**: the immediate **MUST-HAVE SHOPPING LIST**, but also the needs for the development of other capabilities, for Member States to focus their efforts.

- Coming from the mechanism to the outcomes, I take this opportunity to recall that the mentioned processes have shown that - **AT THIS TIME** - we **DO NOT** hold all the necessary capabilities to fulfil the expected LOA.

- And this is why, as Military Committee, we have agreed to **DEVELOP A PROPOSAL** for a 2-phase approach, with **HIGH IMPACT CAPABILITY GOALS** needed for the **SHORT** term (6 years) and the **MEDIUM** one (12 years).

- The results of these military processes have duly informed the implementation of the **CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT PLAN 2018**, through the **STRATEGIC CONTEXT CASES**, and other EU capability related initiatives (CARD, PESCO and indirectly EDF).
• All this also in COOPERATION WITH NATO, of course. That is why the Headline Goal Process is now a 4-year cycle military capability-planning process ALIGNED with the NATO Defence Planning Process.

• This synchronization, ONCE FULLY EXPLOITED, can potentially help both EU and NATO Member States in looking ahead in their defence planning, because - I remind all of us - WHAT IS GOOD FOR THE EU IS GOOD ALSO FOR NATO.

• Still in the context of capabilities, as highlighted in the CHODs meeting last week, we are also LOOKING FORWARD to the opportunity to provide military advice on the FORTHCOMING REPORT from the High Representative on coherence among EU defence initiatives.

• Additionally, another tool in which I believe would benefit from a stronger military voice is the European Defence Fund, which is a critical initiative to step up in EU defence cooperation and its ambition.

• When it comes to the role of EUMC in the European Defence Fund, I would say that – currently - it is very limited due to the fact that the EUMC as a Council body cannot provide advice to another EU institution, in this particular case to the EU Commission.

• A limitation, in my opinion.

• Therefore, I would encourage you, the Member States, to use the results of the Headline Goal Process into the EU Commission work so as to make sure that EU CSDP Military Level of Ambition is achieved.
• In parallel, we must continue to discuss how decision making processes associated with capability development could make a much more systematic and regular use of unfettered military advice provided by the Military Committee while respecting the specificities of EU's institutional framework.

• It is fundamental that the voice of the end users MUST be brought to the political level by the military leadership also in the European Union. Unfettered. It is then up to the political level to decide how to use this advice.

• The role of the Military Committee was designed almost 20 years ago, in a EU living in a completely different security scenario, with a consequent different approach to defence and military matters.

• Since then, the world has changed radically, with new threats adding to the old one.

• The EU has reacted, with responsibility, with its Global Strategy in 2016, which include a paramount role of the military instrument to complement the diplomatic, economic and informative tools.

• And I believe that the inputs provided by the militaries in ALL processes related to EU defence are strongly advisable to guarantee a smoother EU Defence process, with proper requirements, priorities, and descending suitable capabilities, giving coherence and credibility to our CSDP activities, and to the Global Strategy.

• Ladies and gentlemen, the discussion we have just had, wondered: QUO VADIS, to the European Defence.

• But it's really a matter of discussing where we are going, or how and if we really want to get there?
• From our perspective, I think that once we will have properly inserted the military advice in the processes, we will have worked on the how.

• Now - as we have heard here, in Berlin and in other occasions - it’s only a matter of moving from strategies to real implementation, overcoming national approaches and old egoisms, genuinely working together towards what some called a European Defence Union.

• Let me give you one example of this pragmatic approach: along the coming EDF, PESCO projects are really another topic of the day, as you know and confirmed also in Berlin.

• But PESCO must become the opportunity for the EU to demonstrate that we are really serious about our Defence Cooperation.

• How? By selecting, out of the many (47) projects, the real strategic tools we need, accommodating both the industrial approaches and the military common requirements.

• If coherent, this method will allow the EU to advance in its strategies, bypassing individual targets that are in competition with the real objective of a credible EU that wants and needs to speak with a single voice.